


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**EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM AND UNITED STATES
SECURITY**

Bernard K. Gordon

**Research Analysis Corporation
McLean, Virginia**

October 1968



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**East Asian Regionalism
and United States Security**



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STRATEGIC STUDIES DEPARTMENT
PAPER RAC-P-45
Published October 1968

East Asian Regionalism and United States Security

by
Bernard K. Gordon



RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION

MCLEAN, VIRGINIA

Published October 1968
by
RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION
McLean, Virginia 22101

FOREWORD

----- This study, prepared by the Chairman of the Southeast Asia project at RAC, ~~seeks to~~ analyze the nature of American security interests in East Asia in order to relate the concept of Asian regionalism to those interests. The study is part of an ongoing examination of aspects of American foreign policy in the Pacific region and is expected to be followed by related monographs.

Dr. Gordon took his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago and was a Fellow at Harvard University's Defense Studies Program. He has also held Fulbright and Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships, and in 1967-1968 was an Associate of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, The Johns Hopkins University. In addition to university teaching (at Vanderbilt, George Washington, Johns Hopkins, and the University of Singapore), Dr. Gordon is the author of three books and a number of articles related to national security and Southeast Asian affairs. His articles have appeared in World Politics, Pacific Affairs, Asian Survey, Current History, and other journals. His most recent book, Toward Disengagement in Asia, will be published early in 1969.

John P. Hardt

Head, Strategic Studies Department

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

While the analysis and judgments contained in this report are the responsibility of the author, I would like to formally express my appreciation for assistance in its preparation to Dr. John P. Hardt, who on many occasions has taken time to offer the benefit of his judgment; to Mrs. Susan Hice for her forbearance and assistance in preparing the report for publication; to Mrs. Anne V. Cyr for her patient willingness to search out and collect needed data; to LTC James B. Agnew for many varieties of assistance; and to Miss Kathryn Rafferty for help derived from her store of knowledge on the Philippines. Outside of RAC I wish to express my deep gratitude for many pieces of sage advice tendered by my wife, Mrs. Anita M. Gordon, and also specifically to thank her for conceiving and preparing the illustration which appears on p 31.

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**East Asian Regionalism
and United States Security**

ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
ASA	Association of Southeast Asia
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASPAC	Asian and Pacific Council
ECAFE	UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
MAPHILINDO	A loose association formed by Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PKI	Indonesian Communist Party
SEAARC	Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
UN	United Nations

INTRODUCTION

"The nations of Asia," the President has said, "are casting off the spent slogans of earlier narrow nationalism. . . one after another, they are grasping the realities of an interdependent Asia."* One important result is that Americans who are concerned about the future of the US in Asia are once again turning their attention to Asian regionalism, as they did a decade ago when SEATO was formed.

There are, however, some important differences; one of the most fundamental is that regionalism in Asia today, as the President's statement implies, is for the first time a largely indigenous development. For that reason it is potentially more important than before, and Americans will need to understand how this new development may affect us. At the same time a study of Asian regionalism alone, whether focusing on economic, military, or other aspects of possible regional cooperation, will fill only half the need. To be most useful to Americans, a study must not only describe and explain Asian regionalism but must also connect that subject to the foreign policy objectives of the US. And, to accomplish that, a study must inquire into questions that have gone unanswered for almost a generation: it must inquire into the nature of the US national interest in Asia.

Why, after all, does the US government now seem to favor Asian regionalism? Presumably it does so on the basis of a belief that there are objectives of the US in Asia that will be furthered by regional cooperation. But what are those Asian objectives? What national interests of the US in East Asia and Southeast Asia will be served by the development of Asian regionalism?

The answers to those questions are not self-evident. If they were, and if most men understood the nature of the US national interest in East Asia, there would be far less public debate today on policies concerning that area. There would be far less questioning, for example, of the most fundamental assumptions on which American policy in Vietnam is based. This questioning is reflected almost every day in the statements and writings of leading men such as Walter Lippmann, Senator Fulbright, and LTG Gavin. It is reflected in books that suggest that the entire framework of American Asian policy is fundamentally unsound.†

*Lyndon B. Johnson, address in Honolulu, 17 Oct 66, Dept. State Bull., 28 Nov 66, pp 812-16.

†A very recent and widely heralded example is Ronald Steel's Pax Americana, The Viking Press, Inc., New York, 1967. A reviewer commented that Steel "believes the United States does not have a national interest in Asia. . . he thinks the Asian cold war is wrong." Saville R. Davis, Christian Science Monitor, 3 Aug 67.

The questioning of those men is warranted, for the nature of US national interests in East Asia, to say nothing of US objectives, is not widely understood. The reason is that for almost a generation there has not been a coherent explanation of the Asian interests and objectives of the US, and without such a perspective interested Americans cannot properly shape approaches toward a development like Asian regionalism. Without a framework of American objectives they will have no basis for judging the relevance of Asian regionalism to the preferences of the US: is regionalism consistent with American objectives; if so, to what extent?

Thus this study—to be complete—must do three things: First the nature of US interests and objectives in Asia must be identified. That is done by analyzing how the US has behaved in Asia up to now, as well as by examining the contemporary Asian environment. Second, the study must examine the nature of Asian regionalism itself. And third, in order that projections can be attempted, the study must examine the sources and directions of policy represented by some of the key Asian states themselves, for their behavior will heavily determine the outcome of the new regional developments in East and Southeast Asia.

The basic purpose of this study is to deal primarily with the first two of those tasks. Thus Pt I (Chaps. 1 to 3) will be devoted to an identification of US interests in East and Southeast Asia; Pt II (Chaps. 4 to 6) deals specifically with Asian regionalism and will relate that development to the interests and objectives of the US. The third task, analysis of the foreign policies of certain East Asian states, is dealt with briefly here, for there are several related RAC studies now in process that will provide fuller analysis.

PART I

The National Interest in East Asia

Chapter 1

INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES, AND POLICIES

The terms "national interest" and "national objectives" do not mean the same thing to all readers. Instead, the concepts have been the subject of considerable debate, with much confusion between "interests" and "objectives." There is, however, an important priority distinction between them, and the usage applied in this study should be made clear. There are essentially three levels of consideration that lead a nation ultimately to take "actions" in foreign policy: (1) interests, (2) objectives, and (3) policies. National interests are presumed to lead to objectives; objectives will shape policies; and policies, finally, dictate specific action. Interests are presumed to be the least changing and changeable, whereas, at the other extreme, the specific actions that flow from policies are regarded as constantly subject to change.

It is deceptively simple, however, to make that threefold distinction, for it implies that leaders and policy makers shape policy and actions on agreed definitions of the national interests and objectives. A study of American diplomatic history and foreign policy shows, however, that this has not been the case except in wartime. (In wartime, defeat of an enemy has seemed to be national interest and objective enough.) For most of the remainder of the American foreign-policy experience, and especially in Asia, the objectives of the US, as well as its national interests, have often been hotly debated. The debate on Vietnam is only the most recent manifestation of this truth.

But if study of American diplomatic history shows much debate on the purpose and directions of American actions, it shows too the trends compiled by those actions. In this century especially, as the US has become involved in developments in almost every corner of the world, clear patterns of American interest can be detected. They point to two conclusions: first, that there are different levels or steps of US national interest, and, second, that only in some parts of the globe can all these steps be reached.

War and National Interest in Europe and Asia

These conclusions become more clear when the areas where the US has fought its major wars in this century are considered, on the assumption that resort to major war indicates that the most vital national interests are at stake. Major wars have been fought by the US only in Europe and in East Asia, and for the past 20 years the US has signified its willingness to again risk war—

nuclear if necessary—in both these regions. This willingness to risk and resort to war will be tentatively considered the criterion of a Level One national interest.

In the European case a victory of the Central Powers in World War I would have faced the US with a Europe whose political structure would have been dominated by Germany. To help prevent this and to defeat Germany, the US allied itself with Britain and France. The same consideration, if anything on a more intensely felt basis, led the US to ally itself with Britain and the USSR, once more to defeat Germany, in 1941. Finally, since 1948–1949 the US has again been willing to face the prospect of general war in Europe, this time against the Soviet Union.

In each of these three cases there was no direct attack or immediate physical threat to the US or its possessions; instead it was to prevent an outcome, centered on Europe, that the US acted. There seems no question, certainly in the case of Hitler and Stalin, that the outcome that was prevented was hegemony in Europe.

The US has not been active in East Asia's wars quite as long as in Europe; nevertheless it has been almost continuously concerned with or participating in war there since at least 1941. The inevitability of the war that began then, to defeat Japan, was probably presaged a few years earlier, as the US with increasing firmness began to oppose Japan's conquest of China in 1937–1938. Although total war ended in East Asia in 1945 with the advent of nuclear weapons, the US had to resume large-scale war only 5 years later in Korea. That very major limited war came to an end in 1953. Only a year later the US undertook in Indochina and Southeast Asia the guarantees that have led to its becoming involved in a massive way in Vietnam.

In both Europe and East Asia, moreover, these post-1945 evidences of American willingness to undertake general war have been accompanied by major dollar-support programs designed to assist potentially very strong nations to achieve political and economic stability. In Europe the success of the Marshall Plan, along with the guarantees conveyed in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) treaty, has resulted in a Western Europe that does not tempt aggression and subversion today as it did from 1947–1953. In East Asia, US massive assistance in rebuilding Japan (a policy initially resisted by such friendly states as Britain, Australia, and New Zealand) has similarly helped result in a Japan not readily susceptible to overthrow or to threats from without.

Even in this broad portrayal of two quite separate world regions, it seems clear that much is common in the US involvements in Europe and East Asia. The common element appears to have little to do with ideology or even with immediate physical threats; neither Germany nor Japan represented communism, and they were not embarked on direct attacks against the territory of the continental US when war was undertaken.

Instead the common element has to do with the US perception of power relations in Europe and East Asia and the ultimate meaning of those power relations for US security. In each case, that is, the US appears to have undertaken or risked general war to prevent a nation already embarked on aggrandizement from achieving final dominance in Europe and East Asia. The 50-year global behavior pattern of the US indicates that it will accept general war rather

than tolerate that outcome. Later this study will consider why this is so, but for the present it need be said only that this principle does not seem to apply to the US attitude toward any other global region.

The only close parallel, in terms both of constancy of behavior and the importance that the US appears to attach to the region, is in Latin America. There the US has often used force to achieve its aims. In 1962 in a confrontation with the Soviet Union on the issue of missiles in Cuba the US very clearly risked general nuclear war rather than permit a fundamental political change to take place. But the US perception of Latin America differs from its perception of Europe and East Asia in an important respect: the US is clearly the dominant power, to the exclusion of all others, in the Western Hemisphere. Since 1823 the US has come to expect that no other great power should challenge this dominance. Indeed, until the Cuban missile crisis it was not uncommon for observers in recent years to write off the Monroe Doctrine as a dead letter. The famous "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation proved that it is not.

It seems clear, therefore, that the US believes that certain kinds of change in Latin America can affect the vital national interest of the US. Its willingness to risk nuclear war suggests that in Latin America, as in Europe and East Asia, a Level One US interest is present. But there is an important difference: in Latin America the US interest is of a positive nature. The US intends to preserve its own dominance in that region, whereas in Europe and East Asia the US has acted to prevent another state from achieving regional dominance. Nevertheless the similarity is sufficient to allow the vital, or Level One, interests of the US to be expressed as shown in the accompanying tabulation. There have of course been other purposes or interests besides concern with dominance that have guided American behavior in those regions, and the formulation, which provides for only one level of national interest, also does not take into account American concern with other regions of the globe.

Area	US interest
Europe	To prevent one-nation dominance
East Asia	To prevent one-nation dominance
Latin America	To preserve US dominance

The Three Levels of US Interest

The latter point is most readily dealt with, for in Africa and in the combined region of South Asia and the Middle East, American involvements have been both so recent and so tentative that no clear formulation of an overriding US national security interest is possible at this time. This is not to say that there are no US "interests" in Africa and in the Middle East-South Asia region; most certainly there are. But those interests seem to be at a level of significance to US security that is lower than the level in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Two illustrations may help to clarify this point.

There are important economic resources in the Middle East to which the US would prefer to have access. More important, the US would prefer not to

have those resources—oil especially—denied to Western European nations. The US probably would work to prevent the rise of conditions that could lead to such a denial of oil to West Europe, but there is nothing in American behavior that suggests a willingness to risk general nuclear war to prevent that outcome. American behavior has seemed to say, that is, that the US would risk even nuclear war to protect the territorial integrity of Western European nations, but that the US would probably not risk nuclear war to ensure the continued access of those nations to the oil of the Middle East.

Conceivably, of course, resources such as Middle Eastern oil might be evaluated indirectly as a vital US interest. This would be the case, for example, if Western European states could not possibly retain their independent status without the oil of the Middle East. This is very unlikely, and with technological change it is becoming an increasingly remote possibility. In such a situation, whereby the hegemonic European ambitions of the Soviet Union or other great powers would be likely to be achieved because of events in the Middle East, then it could be said that a vital interest of the US had been sensitized. But because of the indirect linkage, it is important not to confuse an essentially one-resource region like the Middle East (even allowing for the Suez Canal as another "resource" of the Middle East) with the vast economic and industrial power and potential of Western Europe. The two regions do not impact with equal immediacy on the US. For that reason it would be more accurate to conclude that the oil of the Middle East, or any similar resource, represents a Level Two interest to the US.

Similar considerations, perhaps even further removed from immediate impact on US security, seem applicable in Africa. Behavior toward events there has indicated that the US has a preference against revolution and violence as the major instruments of African change. Thus the US has worked to prevent or modify some excesses in African political behavior, as in the Congo. It has also welcomed and assisted moderately those few states that seem embarked on developmental programs presumed to have a good likelihood of success, as in Ethiopia. In addition the US has a preference against the extension of Russian and Chinese influence in Africa. For that reason it has sought to reduce the effects of their propaganda and subversive activities there.

On balance, therefore, the US appears to have a preference for access in Africa; access in trade terms as well as in terms of the political leaderships of independent African nations. But there appear to be no resources in Africa that exercise a critical leverage—for example, either on the immediate security of the US or on the continued independence of Western European states—that might place some interests in Africa in the category of a Level Two US interest. Similarly the activities of China and the USSR in Africa, although not to be ignored, are still so tenuous (and political Africa so inchoate) that they bear no significant affinity to power relations either in Europe or in East Asia.

For these reasons most African political developments appear to impact on the national interest of the US at the level of least criticality and specificity. Instead the US interest in Africa can be expressed in terms of the most general relevance: it is an interest in the maintenance of peaceful change as the dominant characteristic of world politics. This US interest in peaceful change,

which the US hopes for everywhere, can be differentiated readily from the two levels of US interest already identified. For example, in Africa there is no question of a vital resource (Level Two), nor is there any likelihood that events in Africa will upset the patterns of dominance—in Latin America, Europe, or East Asia—that the US apparently regards as vital (Level One). Africa therefore represents only the generalized US interest, applicable universally, in peaceful change; this is a Level Three US national interest.¹ Nothing in past behavior or present commitments suggests that the US would risk major war for this level of national interest.

Level Two and Level Three US interests also apply in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia. For example, the US would prefer to see peaceful change as the method in those areas and would for that reason oppose intra-regional conflicts in such regions. In this context the US was opposed to the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia and would similarly oppose and no doubt try to settle a conflict between Ecuador and Peru, as it did between Bolivia and Paraguay in the Chaco War of 1928–1938.² Such conflicts would impact on the US at Level Three of its national interest, and the US, while it might act, would not knowingly risk general war to bring an end to such conflicts.

These considerations underscore the proposition that although some developments in East Asia, Latin America, and Europe can cause the US consciously to risk general war—signifying a Level One interest—no foreseeable developments in other world regions are likely to give rise to that choice.

Another way of saying this is that only Europe, Latin America, and East Asia have contained all three levels of US national interest, and the explanation is found in the concept of regional dominance. It is this concept that is common to the US perception of the three regions, and it is this concept too that defines the national interest in those three regions.

In that sense the concept is a potentially powerful analytical tool as well as a guideline for policy, for it allows us to distinguish the US interest in one global region from another. Perhaps because the US is so often thought of as a global power, and because it does have lower-level interests (Levels Two and Three) everywhere, it may sometimes be forgotten that in its behavior the US has discriminated among the different world regions. Perceptive observers have recognized this, and they have seen too that the basis for discrimination has lain in the US concern regarding dominance in certain regions. Charles Wolf has defined the national interest of the US in precisely these terms: “. . . to prevent the domination of the area by a single power, or by a group of powers acting in concert.”³

But it has remained for such writers as Hans Morgenthau and Nicholas Spykman to relate the concept of regional dominance to the global position and interests of the US. Their writings show clearly how the US has differentiated among world regions.

Fifteen years ago, for example, Morgenthau emphasized that the US interest in Europe, East Asia, and the Western Hemisphere is absolutely and fundamentally distinct from its interests in other world regions. In the Western Hemisphere, he stressed:

We have always endeavored to preserve the unique position of the United States as a predominant power without rival. We have not been slow in recognizing that our predominance was not likely to be effectively threatened by any one American nation or

combination of nations acting without support from outside the hemisphere. This peculiar situation has made it imperative for the United States to isolate the Western Hemisphere from the political and military policies of non-American nations. . . . The Monroe Doctrine and the policies implementing it express that permanent national interest of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. [Ref 4, p 88]

The support from outside that endangered this fundamental goal of preserving US dominance in the Western Hemisphere, Morgenthau continued, came "historically from Europe." For that reason, he added, the US has sought to avoid conditions "conducive to a European nation's interfering in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere or contemplating a direct attack upon the United States."

These conditions would be most likely to arise if a European nation, its pre-dominance unchallenged within Europe, could look across the sea for conquest without fear of being menaced at the center of its power—that is, in Europe itself.

It is for this reason that the United States has consistently—the War of 1812 is the sole major exception—pursued policies aiming at the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. [Ref 4, p 5; emphasis added]

Finally, in dealing with Asia, Morgenthau concluded that in that region too the American "interest is again the maintenance of the balance of power." This purpose has been much less clear than in Europe because, as Morgenthau added, the US has been "vitally concerned" in Asia only since the turn of the century, and also because the nature of US interests there has lacked definition. As a result, policies towards the area have not been precise; they have "never as unequivocally expressed our permanent national interest as have the hemispheric and European policies." Yet, Morgenthau concluded,

. . . underlying the confusions, reversals of policy, and moralistic generalities of our Asiatic policy since McKinley, one can detect a consistency that reflects, however vaguely, the permanent interest of the United States in Asia. And this interest is again the maintenance of the balance of power. [Ref 4, p 5; emphasis added]

Chapter 2

A BALANCE OF POWER IN ASIA

The proposition that the US has consistently sought to maintain a balance of power in Asia deserves special attention. One reason is that this study concerns regionalism, and that concept—like “balance of power” itself—is a familiar method for trying to build stability in international politics. Thus regionalism is sometimes advocated as a building block in achieving global balances.¹ But there is a second reason that the proposition needs to be examined, one that is more concretely American. This is the need to discern whether there has been any consistency to US purposes in Asia, much less something so calculating as a balance-of-power policy. Thus for many people Morgenthau's conclusion will be too sweeping a generalization to be accepted without elaboration. It is important to ask, therefore, how valid is the notion that the US has played a balance-of-power policy in East Asia?

One excellent way to judge is to reexamine the historic behavior of the US in the Far East and to recall how the behavior has been described by historians. To do this, it is necessary to look back to the turn of the century; to the period of the acquisition of the Philippines, the Open Door notes, and other steps that began to signify an active US interest in the politics of East Asia.

Historians do not necessarily agree on which precise US step in that period signals the “beginning” of a US Asian policy, but they do agree on its threefold character: it was related initially to global politics; it was concerned with China; and because its purpose was to prevent any one state from achieving East Asian dominance, it was characterized by shifts in American support.

The Flexible Approach

Shifts in American support, amounting to a seemingly pragmatic and flexible approach, are well illustrated in US relations with Japan and China at the turn of the century. In 1894, for example, those two states were at war, and it was a Japanese victory for which American leaders hoped. “American opinion,” as John Fairbank writes, “favored Japan in her war against China.”² Only a few years later, however, in 1900 and 1903, it was China and her rights that drew strong support from the US, beginning with the first Open Door notes. Then in just another few years US actions made it clear that the earlier support for Japan still existed, for in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 Japan was once again the clear favorite of American opinion and leadership.

The interesting point about this seemingly inconsistent behavior is that even early commentators saw it in approximately balance-of-power terms. Often they concluded that the US simply was suspicious of any Asian power that seemed to be in the process of becoming "too" powerful, and this is the judgment to which today's historians have come as well. In researching Theodore Roosevelt's attitudes and behavior, for example, they have concluded that he was quite conscious of the purpose and direction of his policy in Asia; although he had an undoubted admiration for the Japanese, it was never his purpose to favor Japan's unbridled dominance in the East. Instead, and once again in Fairbank's words, the US "began to turn against Japan after 1904 only when Japan gave promise of being the top dog in the Far East." (Ref 2, p 317)

Indeed historians have described Roosevelt's policies as aiming "to leave a weakened Russia and a strengthened Japan facing each other at the end of the war, thereby equalizing the Manchurian balance of power." (Ref 2, p 317) And as another historian, Tyler Dennet, has put it, "It is impossible to study the period 1898-1904 and not feel that Japan was fighting the battle of the United States in Manchuria. . . it was apparently to American interests that Japan should disturb the Russian over-balance in Manchuria."³

The policy of the Open Door itself should be seen in the same light, although it has sometimes been regarded as a merely commercial initiative or as a piece of moral posturing. Instead the Open Door "was an Anglo-American defensive measure in power politics, without much thought for the interests of the Chinese state." (Ref 2, p 321) Samuel Bemis, one of this nation's most eminent diplomatic historians, has likened British support for the US Open Door declaration in 1900 to earlier British endorsement of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. In both cases, Bemis writes, Britain opposed the partition of "vast areas" (Latin America and China) among foreign powers. It was for that reason that Britain invited the US to cooperate in guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China, for "once more Great Britain wanted to call in the United States to redress the European balance of power. . . this time in the Far East."⁴

At first the US was reluctant to adopt this view of China, but the acquisition of the Philippines helped enormously to alter that. Direct possession of territory in Asia added weight to the arguments of those who had already been urging a more active Asian policy. Thus, in notes first drafted in 1899 and culminating finally in Secretary of State Hay's famous "circular note" of 3 July 1900, it was announced that "the policy of the . . . United States is to . . . preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity."⁵

This doctrine, Bemis adds, should be regarded as "the capstone of American policy in the Far East." (Ref 4, p 352) To understand why he gives this primacy to the Open Door declaration it must be understood that the territorial integrity of China was only instrumentally the central concern of the doctrine and of US policy. The more crucial question was whether some other power, or combination of powers, would be permitted to control China, for it was assumed that the nation or combination of nations that could achieve that objective would already be in possession of a considerable power base elsewhere.

China, the Open Door, and the Global Balance

Perceived in that light, events affecting China have always been the central concern of American Asian policy. At the time of the Open Door this

central concern for China was focused on China as an acted-on state—"on the brink of dissolution," as Bemis writes (Ref 4, p 348). China continued to be weak, if not on the brink of dissolution, until the victory of Mao Tse-tung, and until that time the purpose of American policy was to help prevent its dissolution or control by an alien power.

The reason for this policy was the belief that control of China would fundamentally alter the distribution of power in Asia. Thus, while initially the purposes of the Open Door doctrine were explained in terms of commerce, its main thrust was to help prevent the partition of China by the European states. The US opposed this partition and aligned itself with Britain in that objective, because it believed that a reduction in Britain's relative power globally (which Britain expected would result from a European partition of China) was destructive of US interests. It is in this sense that Fairbank argues that the Open Door should be seen as "an Anglo-American defense measure in power politics, without much thought for the interests of the Chinese state."⁶ The proper explanation of the Open Door policy, therefore, lies in the US desire to preserve two fundamental interests: (a) the maintenance of a balance of power in Europe and (b) continued US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere, for that in turn had depended on balanced power in Europe.

Shortly after the establishment of the Open Door doctrine its wider implications became more apparent. American leaders enlarged its meaning from a doctrine of opposition to the breakup of China to a doctrine of opposition to any nation's control of China. Nicholas Spykman, one of this nation's foremost strategic thinkers, recognized what this reinterpretation of the Open Door meant, for he wrote in 1941 that "it soon became an end in itself, a political consideration inspired by concern with the preservation of a balance of power in the Western Pacific."⁷ Another writer, a diplomatic historian, has stressed the same point: "American diplomacy in Asia between 1900 and 1912 was designed to extend the power of the United States in the Far East. . . to apply the old principles of balance-of-power politics in the form of the Open Door policy." (Williams,³ p 440.)

Japan and the Expansion of the Open Door Doctrine

Although it is debatable that American statesmen in the period 1900-1912 consciously desired to "extend the power of the United States" for its own sake, it is clear that World War I did lead directly to a reinterpretation and expansion of the Open Door doctrine. The reason is that after 1915 Japan attempted to fulfill what it believed to be its great-power destiny, and the US found itself more and more opposed to Japan's aims.

The circumstance that opened this developing confrontation was the withdrawal of the European states from China while they turned the whole of their energies and attention to the war in Europe. Japan, now the only state with the capacity and will to expand its influence into China, moved to fill the void. The US in turn now remained the only state with an interest and capacity to arrest that development. The result was a fundamental change in the structure of the East Asian political environment. Where before 1914 it had been the scene of traditional balance-of-power policies in which the US was just one of several actors, the structure now became more clearly polarized, and the role of the US was soon to become one of direct counterpower.

The first clear sign of this new US-Japanese pattern came in 1915, when Japan, in the form of the Twenty-One Demands,⁸ attempted to impose her own authority on China. The US response was quick. Secretary of State Bryan informed Japan that the US "cannot recognize any agreement . . . impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy . . . commonly known as the open-door policy."⁹ Later, and especially in the 1930's, this pattern of American opposition to Japanese aims was of course to be many times repeated. Some of the signposts to that opposition are found in Stimson's nonrecognition doctrine (1932), in Roosevelt's Quarantine speech (1937), and the denunciation of the US-Japan Commercial Treaty (1939). The sequence of these steps suggests that US policies of opposition to Japan were both early in origin and quite constant and consistent.

However, and perhaps because American responses in Asia were often ineffectual (and usually accompanied to this day by much debate), the underlying single-mindedness of American policy is too often forgotten. It is essential, not only for this study but more importantly for the development of an effective Asian policy today, that the roots of this policy not be hidden.

Consistency: The 1920's and 1930's. One of the foremost post-World War II studies of American foreign policy, undertaken at the Brookings Institution, argues that in the 1930's American leaders were unsure of their purposes—that they were unaware of the nature of the world context in which they were acting. The global power position of the US was fundamentally changed, this argument correctly stresses, but leaders did not realize the extent or significance of the change:

The nature and operation of the old equilibrium of power in Europe, the essential requirements for establishing an equilibrium of power in the Far East, the role that Great Britain had played . . . and finally the part that the United States might be obliged to play because of its own growing strength . . . were not clearly brought into the discussion.¹⁰

The record of the 1920's and 1930's hardly supports this view. It shows instead that American leaders well understood how Japan's goals collided with US interests and that they took the lead in opposing the Asian aims of Japan during this period. After Bryan's rejection of Japan's Twenty-One Demands in 1915 the first post-World War I US effort aimed at Japan was in the conferences leading to the Washington Naval Treaty and the Nine-Power Treaty of 1921-1922. The US dominated both the proceedings and the events that led to them; (the first and informal initiative for these conferences came from Britain, but the initiative was quickly seized and held by the US).

The significance of these meetings is that the US succeeded in having incorporated in the resulting treaties the fundamental declarations of America's Asian policy—the Open Door doctrine of 1900-1903 and insistence on China's integrity. In the meetings, moreover, the positions taken by Secretary of State Hughes show convincingly that the primary concern of the US leadership was with Japan's aims and interests in the Pacific. Japan too recognized this and "from start to finish Japan was an unwilling participant in the Washington conference."¹¹ Indeed, Japan tried to prevent the agenda from touching on her interests in China, but that was precisely what the US insisted must be included,

and its view prevailed. The result was that the world's major powers accepted and endorsed the objectives of US national interest in Asia: that no one state should be dominant in the Pacific.

To the extent that the US succeeded in having other nations support its Asian doctrines [so that "after 1921 the United States was no longer the sole proprietor of those policies" (Ref 4, p 696)] the initiative taken by the US in convening these meetings was productive.¹² But Japan failed to honor its commitments, and the arms-reduction effects of the conference, leaving "Japan in a position of paramount military and naval power in the Far East,"¹³ came eventually to present the US with a dilemma.

This became most clear after 1931, as Japan undertook the conquest of Manchuria and the establishment of the puppet "state" of Manchukuo. As in 1915 when Secretary of State Bryan first warned Japan that the US could not accept incursions on China's sovereignty, American reactions in 1931-1932 were, on their face at least, rather bold. In this instance the response found Secretary of State Stimson taking a highly unusual step: in notes to Japan (and China) he wrote that the US would not recognize any treaty or agreement "which may impair the treaty rights of the United States . . . including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of . . . China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open-door policy. . . ."¹⁴

This announcement, which originated the "nonrecognition" policy of the US, went well beyond what any other nation had declared either privately to Japan or in League discussions up to that time. The conquest of Manchuria, it was felt, would add considerably to Japan's capacity to become Asia's most powerful state, and would at the minimum severely impair China's capability to play a role of independent influence.¹⁵ That the US leadership was more sensitive than other nations to this danger is attested to by the fact that the Stimson "nonrecognition" doctrine, however ineffectual we today know it to have been, was a more severe reaction than any other nation was prompted to make. It underscores two facts: The first is that in 1931 American leaders recognized Japan as their adversary. The second is that the Manchurian aggression helped emphasize to Americans that Asia was now bipolar, for it showed that only the US, not the European powers, was strongly resistant to Japan's expansion. As a result of this realization, and despite the fact that news and public attention were heavily focused on depression and New Deal recovery (and later with the rise of Hitler), Japan's actions after 1932 were given much attention in the US. At each step US responses show that there was no lack of discussion on the developing confrontation.

In 1934-1935, for example, Tokyo released a series of statements on China and on Japan's way to "peace in East Asia." In these statements, especially one in April 1934, Japan warned that it would oppose efforts by other nations to supply China with aircraft, military equipment, and instructors. It was a general warning against interference with what Tokyo called its "mission and special responsibilities in Eastern Asia."¹⁶ These views, which were soon repeated and amplified, were promptly labeled by Americans as "Japan's Monroe Doctrine." In an article with that title a former Under Secretary of State wrote soon afterwards that Japan's policy would (a) "make China a vassal State to Japan," (b) close the open door, and (c) be a "flat repudiation of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922."¹⁷

The State Department responded in a similar vein. It released a public note that restated America's interests in the integrity of China, and, in response to Japan's assertions of "special rights" in China, Washington stressed that "no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned . . . make conclusive its will . . . where there are involved the rights, the obligations and the legitimate interests of other sovereign states."¹⁸ Press reactions also show that there was no mistaking either Japan's intent or, in 1934, the American attitude to her acts. This attitude was typified in one Washington Star editorial comment that "Japan means to set herself up as the supreme, if not the sole, arbiter of Far Eastern, especially Chinese, destinies."¹⁹

Finally a series of scholarly books and writings on the subject began to appear, and these helped put in perspective the continuity of Japan's aims, as well as the continuity of American opposition to them. One, published in Washington in 1935, said simply:

In the Twenty-One Demands made upon China in 1915, Japan made evident her desire to obtain a control over China that would bring that country under her sovereign control. This result she was not then able to obtain, and as a result of the agreements into which she was persuaded to enter at the time of the Washington Conference, it was hoped . . . that this ambition had been abandoned. However, it would now appear that this ambition still exists and influences the national policies of Japan. [Ref 14, p 627; emphasis added]

The final steps in the chronology came not long after, when Japan resumed open war in China in 1937. President Roosevelt, in his famous Quarantine speech, tried to rally public support behind the Government's understanding of Japan's threat. The next day, in order to leave no doubt that it was Japan he had in mind, the State Department said that:

. . . the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of February 6, 1922. . . . [Ref 8, p 19]

There is no need to continue to retell these events here, for the detailed record of events after 1937 and immediately before Pearl Harbor is too familiar. In gross terms the remainder of that record shows that the US in 1938 resumed its naval building program and formally rejected Japan's "new order" in Asia,²⁰ in 1939 announced that it would abrogate its trade treaty with Japan, and in 1940 worked to stop all shipments of scrap and strategic goods by tightening up on the "moral embargo" that Roosevelt had asked for a full 2 years earlier.

In the light of this record there is little to support the view that America's Asian policy lacked direction and sense of purpose. Americans who discussed and wrote about Asia in the 1930's saw that the US goal of a general Asian balance must lead to a confrontation with Japan. Willoughby made this clear in 1935. He concluded with reluctance that the US effort in 1915 to stop Japan's expansion, hopefully "institutionalized" by the Nine-Power Treaty in 1922, had failed.

Policies, Objectives, and the US Interest

But the main concern in this discussion has not been simply to show that US policies consistently opposed Japan in the 1920's and 1930's. The point is instead that those specific policies flowed from an objective, and that objective in turn derived from an interest so fundamental that the policies in support of it led inexorably to war: The US opposed Japan because that policy served the more basic objective of trying to achieve a balance of power in Asia. That objective in turn was sought because it would best serve the US national interest of preventing one-nation hegemony there.

It is not merely the wisdom of hindsight that leads to this conclusion; it was understood and so stated at the time. In his previously mentioned book, published in 1942, Spykman, for example, was already able to place the war with Japan in its balance-of-power context. Looking beyond the war, he reminded Americans that "the danger of another Japanese conquest of Asia must be removed, but this does not inevitably mean the complete elimination of the military strength of Japan and the surrender of the Western Pacific to China or Russia." (Ref 7, p 460) He went further and predicted that "the main difficulty of the postwar period will be not Japan but China, [whose] power potential is infinitely greater than that of [Japan]." (Ref 7, p 469) In words that must have seemed strange in 1942, Spykman's conclusion is striking: "If the balance of power in the Far East is to be preserved in the future . . . the United States will have to adopt a . . . protective policy toward Japan." (Ref 7, p 470)

The obvious implication of Spykman's perceptive and prophetic analysis is that despite the friendship that Americans had developed toward China since at least the 1920's, the US would have to oppose China's political ambitions once her leaders succeeded in achieving unity and power. That of course is precisely what did develop soon after the end of World War II, not primarily because a Communist revolutionary took control in China but because Mao Tse-tung restored unity and embarked on great-power policies.

American dependence on a global balance was clearly threatened by that development, and East Asia in the post-World War II period has been characterized by a continuation of the bipolar conflict that began in 1915. For China under Mao has appeared to aim for East Asian hegemony,²¹ and the US—having opposed Japan's efforts to achieve the same goal—has not been prepared to accept China in Japan's place.

Chapter 3

MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN ASIAN POLICY

If, as described here so far, American purposes and objectives in Asia have been so constant and so clearly aimed to protect the vital interest of the US in preventing one-nation dominance in Asia, why have they always been so intensely questioned and debated by many Americans? Today this debate is reflected in deep and widespread questioning of the purposes of the Vietnam war, but, historically, debate and disagreement have characterized the entire 70-year period of America's Asian involvement. Why?

Part of the answer, it would appear, lies in the strikingly wide gap between the public, official explanations for US Asian policy and the underlying purposes that those policies have been designed to achieve.

Constant Purposes and Inconstant Explanations

Historically American official pronouncements on Asia have been less than candid. At the beginnings of US policy towards China, for example, the discussion was framed in terms of "commercial interest." The Open Door policy itself was publicly justified in those narrow terms, whereas the balance-of-power aims shared by Britain and the US in 1900 are recognized by historians as the more accurate explanation for that historic American initiative. Similarly in 1915, 1922, and 1937-1938 the US justified its opposition to Japan's policies in false terms. Instead of explaining to Americans the need to counter Japan's expansion per se, officials justified policies in terms of the "sanctity of treaties" and "orderly international processes."

The most striking illustration came in 1938, when American opposition to Japan was becoming undeniably clear and Americans were demanding to know why. In this instance the demand came from the Senate in the form of a request from Vice President Garner to Secretary of State Hull. The Senate wanted to know, Garner wrote, precisely what was the extent of American interests in East Asia: what was the extent and dollar value of our Asian trade and of investments in the East, and how many Americans were living in China?

Hull's answer is of classic importance, for it represents the first instance in which the official and public definition of US national interests in Asia broke loose from its traditional trade and commercial mooring. Thus Hull, after first detailing the China trade and the number of Americans residing in China (to comply with the Senate's request to quantify US "interests") wrote this to Garner:

The interest and concern of the United States in the Far Eastern situation, in the European situation, and in situations on this continent are not measured by the number of American citizens residing in a particular country at a particular moment nor by the amount of investment of American citizens there nor by the volume of trade. There is a broader and much more fundamental interest—which is that orderly processes in international relationships be maintained. Referring expressly to the situation in the Far East, an area which contains approximately half the population of the world, the United States is deeply interested in supporting by peaceful means influences contributory to preservation and encouragement of orderly processes. This interest far transcends in importance the value of American trade with China or American investments in China; it transcends even the question of safeguarding the immediate welfare of American citizens in China.¹ [Emphasis added]

Hull's answer shows that statesmen groped—without satisfaction—for a meaningful definition of US national interest in Asia, a definition that would go beyond the usual catechism of investments, trade, and the rights of US nationals in China.

But Hull's letter also shows that statesmen were still unprepared to tell both Americans and Japanese—even in 1938—that the US could not accept an Asia dominated by Japan. Instead the Department of State sought comfort in the relatively meaningless concept of “orderly international processes” as the definition of US national interest—as if the US would risk and face war anywhere and everywhere for that aim. Thus the dialogue and the debate continued to be conducted in mythological terms, just as very often today the war in Vietnam is justified in terms of American support for “self-government for Asian peoples,” or the need to bring democracy to Vietnam.

As a result of this pattern—and it amounts to an unfortunate and unintended deception—Americans have too often been unprepared for actions that their government has later found it necessary to take. This was certainly the pattern in the 1930's, when despite Japan's increasing aggression the US continued to explain its policy in ways that did not help Americans to understand the enormity of the problem. It was no doubt for that reason that, despite the clarity with which Roosevelt may have recognized the Japanese threat to US interests in Asia, his famous Quarantine speech in 1937 met with so little public acceptance and approval.

The Roots of Involvement

This lack of general understanding can be traced to the way in which the US first became heavily involved in Asia, particularly in the acquisition of the Philippines. That step was the most momentous foreign-policy decision that the US had taken since independence. It was hotly argued against at the time and in terms that are perfectly compatible with the tone of debates over Vietnam today. Just as today there are teach-ins and open letters calling for a halt to the war in Vietnam, so there was in 1898 an Anti-Imperialist League. It campaigned “on grounds of policy and morality against territorial expansion in the East and . . . over alien peoples in distant islands,” and President McKinley himself admitted that he “had to look the Philippines up on the globe; [he] could not have told their locality,” he said, “within two thousand miles.”²

But the war with Spain, although it originated in Cuba, had placed the US in de facto control of the Philippines. Fortuitous or not, highly influential men saw how this fitted in with their design to maintain a balance of power in

Asia, and in particular to guarantee that the aims of Germany and Japan in China were countered. The most prominent spokesmen were the men associated with Theodore Roosevelt: CAPT Mahan, Senator Lodge, and others who advocated a "large" policy for the US. They urged that control of the Philippines was the necessary strategic location from which the US could exercise its influence in Far Eastern politics. Although other advisers tried to persuade the President that the whole of the Philippines was not necessary for that task, there were compelling military arguments for taking the entire archipelago. Indeed, Japan already had privately "volunteered" to help the US bear its burden in the Philippines, and Germany entertained an even greater goal until the last moment.

Thus the President took the Philippines, and, although in retrospect he seems to have had little choice the relatively unplanned, almost accidental, and certainly sudden character of the whole venture can hardly be denied. Moreover, it was clear even then (as it is today) that no commercial interest of the US required a major involvement in East Asia,³ and it was ludicrously clear that one of the "reasons" McKinley gave for taking the Philippines—to bring Christianity to the heathen Filipino—was patently false. The Philippines had already been converted to Catholicism, and even today Filipinos resent the ignorance that McKinley's statement disclosed.

These almost accidental roots of the first major US involvement in Asia helped make it difficult for American leaders to explain and justify ensuing American involvements there as well. Clearly an "interest" was created by acquiring the Philippines, for "policy is the fruit of history and experience, seldom of some abstract design," as Assistant Secretary William Bundy has said recently.⁴ Yet the unplanned origins of our East Asian involvements have added to the doubts and uncertainty that have accompanied our actions there ever since. For as long as statesmen were unwilling frankly to say that the US was interested in and required a balance of power among the nations in Asia, how could they honestly explain their Asian policies?

Aside from prospects of potential Asian trade, they were unable to point to the convenient myths that have been ostensible "guiding principles" for our European and Western Hemisphere policies. Unlike the situation for policy makers concerned with Latin America, when it came to Far Eastern problems there was nothing like a Monroe Doctrine, with which every schoolboy was familiar. Americans had satisfied themselves that that doctrine was justification enough for US dominance in Latin America. Similarly, and unlike those responsible for European affairs, US leaders could not cite George Washington's warning against "entangling alliances" with which Americans had justified staying out of Europe until 1917. There were no hoary guidelines for a US Asian policy because in the early days of this republic East Asia was not yet a part of world politics. Thus, in the absence of guidelines and for a generation after 1900, policy makers responded to specific events in Asia as they had had to respond to Admiral Dewey's sudden control of Manila Bay and Luzon: intuitively and uncertainly.

Intuitively too they responded to some larger changes in Asian and European politics that coincided with their control of the Philippines. For by 1900 it was no longer true, as it had been during the nation's first century, that East Asia was not a part of world politics. That loose and easy background was

forever destroyed when the European powers began their efforts to carve up China into spheres of influence. Putting this another way: it is clear now that when the rivalries of the great European states were expanded to East Asia, it meant the incorporation of China and Japan into the global international system.

The US in Britain's Role

The extension of European politics to East Asia coincided, moreover, with the point in history at which Great Britain was ceasing to be dominant in the system of world politics, and that timing proved to be crucial for the future development of US foreign policy. It was British dominance of the global system, after all, that had insulated the US from Europe and allowed Washington's warning against European alliances to be a feasible policy. It was also British power that had guaranteed the Monroe Doctrine, because Britain too wanted to keep Latin America free of European control. By 1890-1905, as Whitehall knew, other nations were achieving great-power status, most notably Germany and most surprisingly Japan. These changes in the global structure implied a relative decline in Britain's power and proved to be crucially important for the US. In sum, the Pax Britannica—which had given the US almost a century of indirect national security protection—was coming to an end.

In Asia this meant that London would not be able to prevent a division of China into spheres of influence⁵ (or worse yet, the domination of China by one nation alone). The behavior of American statesmen, particularly their tacit and informal understanding with London leading to the Open Door, indicates that they sensed the effect of these changes on the US: If by controlling much of China one of the great European powers were able to eclipse Britain's power, that would overwhelm the global balance, and US insulation from Europe as well as US dominance in Latin America depended on the preservation of that balance. Thus it was in the interest of US security to prevent any further decline in Britain's relative power globally, and the US did precisely that in the years after 1898. It did this indirectly by helping to prevent the expansion in the Pacific of powers like Germany and by helping to prevent the breakup of China; it did this directly by going to Britain's aid in 1917. For US leaders not to have acted in the years around 1900, e.g., not to take the Philippines, or to acquiesce in the division of China, would in effect have been to help diminish British power by allowing others to continue their rise. Thus when US leaders acted in ways that were parallel to British interests, they acted most essentially to protect the security of the US.

Except for a few leaders like Theodore Roosevelt and CAPT Mahan, it is unlikely that the full shape of these steps was clearly understood at the time. The actual behavior of the US, whatever its specific intent, meant that the US was succeeding to, and reinforcing, the global balance-of-power policies that Britain had exercised to preserve its own security. This pattern took shape only gradually, and as we have seen, only in response to the force of specific events, such as the Twenty-One Demands in 1915. Yet American statesmen, even if they did gradually recognize the import of their behavior, were hardly able to proclaim publicly that it was their objective to maintain the world balance of power by going to the aid of Great Britain. But that of course is what the US did do on several occasions, until in 1945 the US emerged with its own power unchallenged.

Partly because of the pragmatic and ad hoc beginnings of US involvement in East Asia (and also because of the extent to which US behavior was essentially a reaction to events) no meaningful and explicit statement of US interests and objectives existed up to the time of the war with Japan. In a book completed just before Pearl Harbor and devoted to the entire Japanese-US relations, William Johnstone concluded as late as July 1941 that there had been a "failure of the American people and the American Government to agree on a definition of what our national interest in the Far Eastern situation really is."⁶

The National Interest of the US

The best attempt to define the national interest was in the Hull letter of January 1938. There, finally, it was at least stated that "there is a broader and more fundamental interest" that "transcends the value of trade with China or American investments. . . it transcends even the question of safeguarding the immediate welfare of American citizens in China." But what was this "broader and more fundamental interest"? In the Hull letter and other official documents it was identified only as the US concern "that orderly processes in international relations be maintained." (Ref 6, p 32)

This definition was not false; it was merely vague. Rather than focus on the condition of Asia that was in the US interest to see achieved, it focused on the method—"orderly processes." As in the past, when statesmen had tried to explain US Asian policies in terms of commercial interests, friendship for the Chinese people, or treaty obligations, their emphasis now on "orderly processes" was unconvincing. The true interest of the US—an East Asia in which no one nation exercised dominance—had to be deduced, and only with great difficulty, from the official explanations. A few did this, and Johnstone himself came close. After listing among the "basic objectives" of US Far East policy such things as the Open Door, "the independence of China," and the need "to protect the lives and property of its citizens in the Far East," Johnstone included with his list the recommendation that the US should "continue to oppose the domination of large areas of the Far East by one nation to the exclusion of the rights and interests of other nations. . . ." (Ref 6, p 352).

But it remained for Spykman, writing at the same time, to elevate that objective to its proper position and to state it in terms relevant to US security. He saw that Japan's conquest of China, and its resulting dominance in Asia, "would mean the final destruction of the balance of power in the transpacific zone which would have ultimate repercussions on our power position in the Western Hemisphere." (Ref 7, p 155) And he stated frankly that "our power position in the world. . . had always depended on the existence of a balance in Europe and Asia. . . ." (Ref 7, p 195; emphasis added)

That national interest, not simply the desire to see "orderly processes" in world affairs, lay behind US opposition to Japan. But the official propensity not to face that reality, reflected in a generation of misleading explanations of policy, resulted in a double failure in the 1930's: it caused our adversary to misjudge us, and it allowed the American people to misjudge how Japan's actions affected them.

In that failure, and especially the failure to inform the people, lies the explanation for the historic and repeated difficulties faced by American leaders when they have sought eventually to protect the nation from dangers emanating

in Asia. The American people have not had honestly driven home to them that in Asia as in Europe their nation's interest requires a balance of power. In the absence of that explanation almost every important step in US Asian policy, from as early as 1937 until the present, has been subject to greater doubts, with consequent official indecision, than the facts and the interest warranted. In the confrontation with Japan, as Spykman realized, administrations never felt free to make clear to Japan how adamant US opposition was to one-nation dominance in Asia. "We have employed," he said, "all the methods available in international relations except one. We have tried persuasion, barter. . . but we have never been willing to go to war and that explains. . . the reason why our diplomacy has had so little success." (Ref 7, p 155) Earlier in the same work he had stated:

Every time a situation emerged which demanded that the United States decide on a course of action in the face of Japanese expansion, the debate was re-opened. Should we attempt to check the growing power of Japan or should we take the point of view that the Far East is far away and that its balance of power does not concern us? [Ref 7, p 140]

Despite that debate, however, the main thrust of American policy remained the same, and as this discussion has argued already, the trend and tendency of that policy was increasingly hostile to Japan. From 1915 it was a constant policy, and if on the eve of Pearl Harbor US officials still refrained from explaining why the nation was opposed to Japan's actions, some unofficial observers did not.

One of these was Walter Lippmann. Writing during the war, he stressed that because Japan understood US aims, its leaders had to attack Pearl Harbor:

. . . For the Japanese would not have attacked Pearl Harbor if we had accepted the terms they offered us. They did not attack Pearl Harbor for the sake of sinking our Pacific fleet. They tried to sink our Pacific fleet because we were opposing them on matters that they were determined to carry through.

There is no mystery about what these were. Japan was committed to the conquest of China. . . . The Japanese were willing to negotiate, to compromise, and at least to postpone, their demands outside of China. There was the irreconcilable issue. When the United States refused finally to assent to the conquest of China, and to desist from opposing Japan in China, Japan went to war.⁶

Then, emphasizing precisely the continuity in policy that this report has stressed, Lippmann concluded:

. . . the American nation reached this momentous decision gradually, reluctantly, but with increasing unanimity and finality, over a period of about forty years. The remarkable thing about the record of these forty years is the constancy with which the United States government has stood for the integrity of Chinese territory. [Ref 8, p 259]

Remarkably, it was only after the war, and only when the Communists had completed their conquest of China, that the US Government finally acknowledged that this had been the true purpose of American policy. Earlier statements

had refused to face the fact squarely. In the fullest official prewar statement of national interest Secretary Hull had only with difficulty acknowledged that our "interest" in Asia transcended the usual litany of material and economic interests. Suddenly, however, in a famous White Paper of 1949, the Department of State changed its public explanation of prewar Asian policy. It emphasized—as if it had been clearly stating it for a generation—that the US has "asserted that the domination of China by any one Power or any group of Powers is contrary to the interests both of China and the United States."⁹

The fact, however, is that the US had not explicitly asserted this objective, although its behavior for 50 years had been clearly and consistently aimed in that direction. That is why this report was aimed to show that despite the varied and often irrelevant statements with which the US Government explained its Asian policies from 1898 to 1945, a consistency of purpose based on a good understanding of American interest has in fact always characterized America's Asian policies.

These policies, as the State Department acknowledged in 1949 but avoided saying for the entire 50-year period before that, were motivated by one aim: to prevent any one-nation dominance in East Asia.¹⁰ The US security requirement that justified that interest (and led to the objective of preventing China's conquest) was the conviction that any nation that could dominate China would have within reach the dominance of all East Asia, and that would threaten to upset the global balance on which US security historically was founded. Historically the US has indeed sought to achieve and maintain a balance of power in East Asia; but here a warning must be entered, for balance of power as an objective is not necessarily the same as balance of power as a method and a policy.

The distinction is important, especially when it helps to underline the remarkable constancy that has marked US involvement in East Asia. It is a constancy, however, of purpose, i.e., of interest. Objectives and policies, the latter most clearly, have not been inflexible. Thus the answer to the previously stated question, "How valid is the notion that the US has played a balance-of-power policy in East Asia?" seems clear: the US has not always followed a balance-of-power policy, but it has generally sought an overall Asian balance. It has sought that balance as an objective because an Asian balance would by definition be a reflection of the US interest—that no one nation dominate Asia. That aspect of the US in East Asia, its overriding national interest, has been its constant characteristic.

PART II

Regionalism and US Objectives

Chapter 4

THE US AND MULTIPOLARITY IN ASIA

If study of America's past involvements in Asia shows a constant and consistent tendency to achieve but one overriding purpose, it shows too that the US has tried various methods to meet that objective. Sometimes the method has been through unilateral declarations and efforts, as in the Open Door declaration itself. At other times the method has emphasized multilateralism, although even in a multination framework the US often found itself in the lead. The reason was that over the years Washington was forced to conclude that no other capital was as anxious and able to prevent one-nation dominance in East Asia. Thus in 1922 when the Nine-Power Treaty incorporated the essence of the Open Door doctrines this was undoubtedly a multilateral achievement, but in a more important sense it was merely a multilateral endorsement of essentially American interests.

In the 1930's, when it became clear that multilateralism was ineffective, the US often tried to achieve its aims unilaterally, but those efforts were generally restricted to ineffective declarations. Finally in 1941 the US had to resort—essentially unilaterally—to full-scale war to prevent Japan from upsetting its national interests in East Asia. Ever since that time the US regularly has had to repeat its unilateral (or near-unilateral) behavior pattern, but it has never entirely discarded multilateralism. Instead it has frequently sought to enlist the help of others in policies that supported American interests. The massive military involvement in Vietnam today is only the latest reflection of this behavior pattern, which we might say began just before the war with Japan: to take action alone if necessary but with others if possible.

Thus the US has seldom if ever resisted at least the trappings of multilateralism when that was the aim of other states as well. This was the pattern in 1943 when the US established a Pacific War Council;¹ in 1950 when it obtained United Nations (UN) endorsement for its resistance to aggression in Korea; in 1951 and in 1954 when ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and the US) and SEATO were established; and in 1966 when it convened a meeting in Manila of the nations actively supporting its Vietnam war effort. As in 1950, the US today seeks to provide at least the color of multination endorsement for military actions that it would undertake alone if necessary.²

RETURN TO MULTILATERALISM

Most recently, however, the US has once again begun to encourage the other side of multilateralism: the one that looks beyond those useful but temporary military alliances toward groupings of Asian states based on wider and more enduring convergencies of interest. This tendency has become apparent since 1965; it is reflected most clearly in the hopeful interest that US leaders now express in Asian regional cooperation generally, and particularly in the regional "initiatives" recently undertaken by Thailand, Indonesia, and Japan.³

The US encourages these steps toward Asian regionalism for two kinds of reasons. The first lies in the expectation that regional cooperation, especially among smaller developing countries, can aid in speeding the processes of economic development. This conviction explains, for example, American support for regional economic cooperation in Latin America. There the US is pressing for the establishment of a Latin American common market, and it encourages other steps aimed at economic integration as well. In Asia, however, few would suggest that a common-market approach is worth considering now, and for that reason the US encourages other forms of economic regionalism. The best-known example is the establishment of the Asian Development Bank, which owes much to American support, and the US is also encouraging a variety of other less-well-known cooperative steps in South-east Asia.⁴

But these efforts reflect only the essentially economic aspects of regional cooperation. The other aspect, the one that has become increasingly apparent since 1965, is based more clearly on political considerations. This side of American interest stems from the belief that as regional cohesion develops in Asia, especially to the extent that it includes Japanese participation, it will help establish an added power center in Asia. Such a development, if successful, would loosen the tight bipolarity that has characterized the East Asian international system since at least 1937.

Judging by recent American actions and the statements of the most senior US officials, American policy is already embarked in this direction. Since 1965, statements by the President and his closest advisers have reflected the belief that Asian regionalism will be directly in support of US national interests in Asia. Both immediate and longer-term objectives are involved.

The short-term political objective is a pragmatic one and will be touched on only briefly here. This is essentially the belief that, with the added development and stability that regional cooperation may bring, Asian states will grow less susceptible to subversion and also better able than now to bear the costs of defending against it. But the more fundamental US interest relates to the structure of international politics in East Asia. This is the American hope that Asian regionalism will lead to a multibloc system in the 1970's—something akin to the balance-of-power system that operated before World War I.

It cannot be proved, of course, that the earlier balance-of-power structure—the one that ended in 1915—did in fact provide for security and stability in East Asia. But it is clear that, when that multibloc structure deteriorated, a

30-year situation of bipolarity in Asia culminated ultimately in war. It is in the hope of avoiding another such general conflagration, which may be the product of any international structure that is too tightly bipolar,⁵ that the US encourages today the building of other power centers in East Asia. Such a multicentered (or multipolar) Asia would be consistent with US interests because the US does not require an American-dominated Asia; it requires only that no one state or combination of states achieves all-Asian dominance.

SHIFTS IN US OBJECTIVES: A MULTIPOLAR ASIAN STRUCTURE

If the new direction of US policy is to encourage Asian regionalism and the reestablishment of a multipolar Asian structure, this suggests that historically US Asian policy will look something like the swing of a pendulum. The pendulum might be described by saying that on one side of its arc multilateralism was the dominant characteristic of US behavior in East Asia. On the other side US behavior has been characterized by unilateral responses.

Using such an image, it could be said that US policy began, at the turn of the century, with multilateralism. In the 1920's and 1930's it swung gradually away from that policy; its tendency was towards increasing self-reliance. In 1941 US policy reached the extreme point of unilateralism (and unilateral armed forces) in the war to defeat Japan. Today this pendulum appears for the first time to be moving away from self-reliance; it seems to be shifting once again toward multilateralism.

This is the meaning of American policies, evident since at least 1965, to encourage Asian regionalism strongly and to welcome the renewal of Japan's active role in Asia. The result of such policies, if they are successful, will mean an Asia that is neither balkanized nor characterized by just the two-power confrontation of China and the US. It will mean instead an East Asia in which several actors are of major significance, implying US behavior in a multipolar or multicentered Asia for the first time since 1915. These trends are portrayed in a flow chart in Fig. 1.

Until 1915 East Asia was clearly a multicentered international system. The US participated in that system much like other states; it followed balance-of-power policies. The system itself guaranteed that the US interest was preserved, for the US interest was identical with the purpose of the system: to prevent any one nation from dominating the whole. After 1915, however, East Asia's structure became bipolar, and after 1931-1932 its bipolarity was intensified. The US, still aiming to prevent one-nation dominance, found itself more and more impelled to rely on its own counterpower; this tendency reached its highest point in the 1941-1945 war.

This bipolarity continued in the postwar era, for since 1949 East Asia has been characterized by an indirect China-US confrontation, just as between 1915-1945 it was characterized by the more direct Japan-US conflict.

Today, however, under the impact of three important tendencies, this bipolar structure is eroding. The first of these trends is Japan's reemergence in Asian politics. The second is the renewed and now widespread interest in regional cooperation in Southeast Asia itself. The third is that both of those




Fig. 1—Direction of US Policy in a Changing Asian Structure

developments are now being encouraged actively by the US—particularly the regional efforts in Southeast Asia. The first two, moreover, appear to be mutually reinforcing. Japanese leaders, who have been reluctant to reenter Southeast Asian affairs, apparently find less difficulty in promoting the broader goal of Southeast Asian regional cooperation. At the same time, to Southeast Asian leaders who have feared new Japanese dominance of their separate small states, the concept of a more cohesive region offers the prospect of dealing less unequally with Japan. These leaders realize that much of their progress towards collaboration will depend on technical and capital assistance from Japan, and a Japanese role will become more acceptable precisely to the extent that the Southeast Asian states themselves develop a degree of regional cohesion. Lacking that, they will inevitably remain too easily susceptible to Japan's sheer weight in Asian affairs.

But whatever the precise "mix" of Asian regionalism, and Japan's role in that mix, as US assistance and encouragement accelerate this process the US simultaneously will be helping to restructure the nature of East Asian international politics.

This appears to be no accidental by-product of American actions; it seems instead to be the conscious goal of the President and his most senior advisers. This is merely another way of saying that as the structure of the East Asian international system changes (in this case reflecting Japan's resurgence and the Southeast Asian interest in regionalism) the nature of US objectives in East Asia must also undergo change. The US interest remains the same—to prevent any one-nation dominance in the region—but there is no desire to press that interest to the point of a conflict with China. A bipolar Asia could lead to such a conflict, and in that sense there was deep truth in Roger Hilsman's warning in early 1966 that US policy in Asia was on a "collision course with China." The desire to avoid such a collision explains the American concern today to develop conditions that can lead to a new multipolar Asia; no better evidence for this intent can be found than in the views of the President himself.

THE US NATIONAL INTEREST AND ASIAN REGIONALISM

Probably the clearest expression of White House thinking on this subject can be found in a previously mentioned major address delivered by President Johnson in October 1966. That speech, given in Hawaii, is notable on several counts. Perhaps its most striking feature is that it represents one of the rare public occasions on which a President has frankly acknowledged the overriding national interest of the US in East Asia. "No single nation," the President said there, "can or should be permitted to dominate the Pacific Region." [Emphasis added]

This was no offhand comment. Instead the President's statement represents a crucial part of a major speech in which he sought to welcome a new spirit of pragmatism in East Asia. This new spirit, he correctly said, is concerned more with the hard tasks of development than with the kind of sloganeering and ideologizing best symbolized by the Bandung Conference a decade earlier. Thus when the President listed the "realities" that typify Asia today, he pointed

not only to the interest in preventing one-nation dominance but also to the new spirit of regional cooperation in Asia. "One after another," he said, "the nations of Asia are casting off the spent slogans of earlier narrow nationalism. . . one after another, they are grasping the realities of an interdependent Asia."

To illustrate the "new spirit" of pragmatism and cooperation now evident in Asia the President cited the establishment of the Asian Development Bank, the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), and a number of other initiatives that the US welcomes.⁷ The hope, as the President put it, is that eventually "the cooperative tasks of assistance and defense will be assumed more and more by others." This was a theme he had expressed just a few weeks earlier when he frankly acknowledged the relation between regional cooperation and US interests: "Our purpose in promoting a world of regional partnerships is not without self-interest. For as they grow in strength. . . we can look forward to a decline in the burden that America has had to bear this generation."⁸

Near-identical views are increasingly found in the remarks of Walt Rostow, one of the President's closest advisers and his Assistant for National Security Affairs. On several occasions Rostow has sought to put regional cooperation into postwar historical perspective. One major speech he titled "Regionalism and World Order," and in another more recent talk he said:

We are finding. . . in regionalism, a new relationship to the world community somewhere between the overwhelming responsibility we assumed in the early post-war years—as we moved in to fill vacuums of power. . . and a return to isolationism.⁹

In these and other talks, as well as in the remarks of the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (William Bundy), at least two points are frequently emphasized. First that in its Asian policy the US now "is actively supporting. . . regional cooperation," and second that developments in Asian regionalism are seen in connection with Vietnam. It is held not that the US defense effort in Vietnam has "caused" regionalism, but that along with increased awareness of China's apparent threat it has helped to create a suitable environment for Asian cooperation. Thus Rostow has remarked that "the most dramatic emergence of a new regional spirit and policy is, of course, in Asia,"⁹ and when he spoke recently about Vietnam he made the linkage quite explicit:

In the couple of years since we have made the decision to fight there, the people of Asia have gathered confidence in their future. They believe that we are going to see it through, and on that basis they are beginning to build their futures, and it is one of the most exciting of the post-war developments I know, namely this move toward Asian regionalism. This is not a view confined only to those who have put fighting troops in. The people in Singapore and in Indonesia and in Malaysia have drawn the same conclusion.¹⁰

Rostow is probably correct in emphasizing the extent to which regionalism in Southeast Asia represents an important development in Asian affairs. It is not that the idea is altogether new, for Southeast Asian leaders have been talking vaguely about regionalism at least since 1946. But it is only in the 1960's that the concept has begun to take on a level of political significance that warrants special attention by the US.

In part this is because previously vague notions of regionalism have begun to assume a more pragmatic and practical flavor, usually related to specific

programs concerning economic development. The best-known examples are the Asian Development Bank and several smaller-scale institutions or groups that have been created in the past few years. In addition, however, regionalism has recently begun to attract the attention of Asian states that traditionally have avoided such efforts. A good illustration of such attention in Southeast Asia is Indonesia. Under the government headed by GEN Suharto, Indonesia began early in 1966 to work for the creation of Southeast Asia's newest regional group: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Its origins and meaning will be discussed in the next chapter. There are, moreover, indications that Japan also seeks to promote increased collaboration,¹¹ and even in Rangoon the concept of cooperation is not treated with the same indifference—and sometimes hostility—that was common even 2 years ago. In sum it can be said that the idea of regionalism in Southeast Asia is in a state of transformation today. It has shifted from an environment of low intensity to one in which almost all states in Asia seek to give the concept of regionalism their own imprint.

One result of this new interest is that in the 1960's there is even a certain competitiveness about the activity. For in addition to such wholly economic bodies as ECAFE (the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East) and the Asian Development Bank, there are now several organizations aiming to promote more broad-based cooperation. Among these are the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), formed in 1961; the ASPAC, formed in 1966; and ASEAN, formed in 1967. This newest group, perhaps the most promising, includes Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

In the face of this activity it is most reasonable to ask two questions: how meaningful are any of these regional efforts, and why have Southeast Asian leaders renewed their interest in the concept?¹² To help answer the first question the most politically important regional groups will be analyzed, but it is important first to explain why the concept is so widely discussed in Southeast Asia today.

INCENTIVES FOR REGIONALISM: CHINA, ECONOMICS, AND THE US

The incentives for regionalism are not hard to find. They lie in the nature of Asian perceptions of Communist China; in the nature of the development problems faced by the smaller Asian states; and in the US role in Asia. Of these three main elements, the impact of China will be considered first.

China's role in East Asia for the purposes of this study can be readily identified. China intends to achieve great-power status, and, like leaders of a great power, her leaders expect to be regarded as dominant in the region of the globe in which they live.¹³ To achieve such a condition, China must seek the withdrawal of powerful and significant Western influences in East Asia, especially as they are represented by the US.¹⁴ This means, to put it most bluntly, that China aims to achieve a position of dominant influence in East Asia.¹⁵

In the short term, in the view of many analysts of Chinese behavior, China's thrust must be in the direction of Southeast Asia.¹⁶ This is in part because the more traditional buffer areas of concern to China—in her north

and northwest—are now blocked to her influence by the powerful presence of the Soviet Union. Similarly China is at present prevented from attempting to exercise much influence for the time being on her eastern flank in Japan. A dynamic and enormously prosperous Japan makes it pointless to attempt to achieve major influence there at this time.

Southeast Asia, on the other hand, represents a power vacuum relative to other areas of traditional interest to China. Moreover, and compared with those other areas of interest, Southeast Asia is near-ideal for the application of Mao Tse-tung's modern revolutionary doctrines. In that sense Southeast Asia holds the potential of great gains with a lower level of effort and risk than would be involved in other regions adjacent to China.¹⁷ Finally it is in Southeast Asia that the power and policies of the US—China's self-proclaimed major adversary—are seen as most provocative and need, from Peking's perspective, to be neutralized.

Yet it must be said that in the view of some commentators China's foreign policies in the years since Mao took power appear only as defensive-responsive reactions. David Mozingo, for example, has argued prominently in World Politics that China is willing to live at peace with any Southeast Asian state that does not associate itself closely with the US.¹⁸ And Henry Steele Commager, a dean of American historians, has asserted flatly that "Chinese expansion is pretty much a figment of our imagination."¹⁹

But China's own words and actions strain this interpretation. Peking's repeated calls to overthrow the "Rahman puppet clique" in Malaysia, a government that is not tied formally to the US, is one case in point.²⁰ Similarly, to the extent that there was Chinese involvement in the abortive 1965 effort to stage a coup in Indonesia—a nation with intimately close ties to Peking—that involvement must also call into question the thesis that China is merely defensive in her dealings with other Asian governments.²¹ And most recently, China's calls in 1967 for the overthrow of the Ne Win government in Burma (a regime that seemingly has gone out of its way to placate China) suggests again that if China is merely reactive, she reacts to threats that few others can perceive.²²

It would instead be more accurate to conclude that if Peking does seek friendly relations with governments in Southeast Asia, the only governments "acceptable" are those subject to major Chinese influence. This may be simply another way of saying that China, emerging from 2 centuries and more of decline, is beginning to behave in ways consistent with the traditional behavior of great powers and for this reason will aim for predominant influence on her rimland. Yet some analysts, when they deny the need for a continuing US involvement in Asia, fail to see this. A leading Australian scholar has remarked, for example, that those who deny need for countervailing power around China reflect "an exceedingly optimistic view of the way Chinese power is likely to be used. . . [and] an assumption that China is somehow a Power unlike all other Powers, neither needing to be checked by countervailing power nor susceptible of so being." The unreality of this proposition, she has concluded, "is apparent as soon as it is made explicit":

To argue in 1966 that China could never be expected to acquiesce in a rival power structure in South Asia is precisely equivalent to arguing in 1946-47 that Russia could never be expected to tolerate a rival power structure in Western Europe. Such a situation

was possible and Russia did in fact come to accept it, and twenty years after the process began . . . the prospects for peace look a good deal better than when it was initiated. To assume that China must be conceded unchecked hegemony in South Asia is to acquiesce in so substantial an addition to her future power-base (taking into account manpower and resources and nuclear weapons) that it is difficult to see the consequent world finding a way to live quietly or to keep its crises manageable. There is of course no present similarity between the situation of South Asia and that of Western Europe. That is why the intervention of the outside Powers over a long transition period (perhaps twenty years) is likely to remain necessary.²³

In broad terms this is the view increasingly held by the political leadership, and much of the intellectual leadership too, in most Southeast Asian states today. It is not a universally held view, to be sure, and there are articulate spokesmen for the view that China poses no major security threat to Southeast Asia. But that is not a view held by the leadership in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, or Singapore. It is not even the view held by Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia, who stated recently that "China does not swallow Cambodia because of the Americans."²⁴ A few weeks later the Prince made the point even more sharply; he told newsmen that if China caused unrest in Cambodia, and if there should not be enough arms and ammunition to cope with a rebellion, "I would have to retire and hand over to the army, which would be obliged to turn to the Americans."²⁵ These are not new-found convictions for Sihanouk, for even in 1965 he had written that "after the disappearance of the USA from our region and the victory of the Communist camp, I myself and the People's Socialist Community that I have created would inevitably disappear from the scene."²⁶

Southeast Asian leaders find less difficulty in reaching this conclusion than Americans, whose perception of China has for years been complicated by a number of myths and contradictions. There is in Southeast Asia, for example, no real equivalent to the China Lobby, and little parallel to the imagery and literature about China's travail that sparked the sympathy of millions of Americans before World War II. Instead China represents to politically aware Southeast Asians three important elements, and only one of those has given rise to a sympathetic and friendly view of China.

The first element is simply that in the Southeast Asian view China is the traditional and alien great power of the region with a long history of exercising much influence. Considering the fact that China represents one of the few truly great and cohesive world cultures, it is not surprising that her presence has long overawed the more primitive peoples of Southeast Asia. When those peoples did achieve a higher degree of culture, as they did in Vietnam, their culture was very much the product of Chinese influence. But being deeply influenced and even shaped by Chinese culture and behavior norms has not endeared China to the peoples on her rim, as the history of Japanese and Vietnamese relations with China helps demonstrate.

Secondly, in modern Southeast Asia the "normal" anxieties that a small state might in any case feel toward the giant of its region are intensified by the role of the Nanyang or [overseas] Chinese populations. It is a truism too well-known to elaborate here that throughout Southeast Asia the Nanyang Chinese exercise a position of economic dominance that is widely resented, feared, and distrusted. The movement of Chinese to Southeast Asia is relatively recent; it was much accelerated by the economic and administrative policies of the

colonial regimes of the past few centuries. Yet despite their recent arrival, the Chinese have been the dominant ethnic group in economic (and sometimes political) matters in Malaysia, Cambodia, and Thailand and in some important respects in Indonesia and the Philippines.

There are qualifications, to be sure: in Cambodia the Nanyang have shared preeminence with the Vietnamese,²⁷ in Thailand they have achieved a degree of assimilation that has smoothed the roughest edges of anti-Chinese sentiment, and in the Philippines the Chinese have not occupied quite the role of influence typical elsewhere in the region. But these qualifications do not reduce the intensity of a basic racism, aimed at local Chinese, that is one of Southeast Asia's most distinguishing characteristics. In the years since independence it has resulted in numerous instances of abuse and intimidation, and where free rein has been given (as in Indonesia) murder has not been uncommon. The presence of this strong ethnic resentment means that there are "two Chinas" in the minds of many Southeast Asians: China the great and perhaps fearsome nation and China the source of the despised and dominating alien group at home. The two mental images are probably mutually reinforcing, and neither is a positive factor from Peking's viewpoint.

It is only modern "political" China that has sometimes been sympathetically viewed among some groups in Southeast Asia. There has been much admiration for modern China's accomplishments, and not just in the overseas Chinese communities. This dates back to the Kuomintang period and the fact that even under Chiang Kai-shek China was able to assert her independence and her identity, especially against the Westerners. When the Communists came to power after 1949 and capped Chiang's limited achievements with the establishment of an effective central government, it was inevitable that many millions in Southeast Asia would be moved and encouraged by Mao's successes. In part this is because they could be understood not only as China's successes but as Asia's success against the West. To Southeast Asian elites, who had smarted under generally oppressive colonial restrictions, the banners that Mao carried had to be vastly appealing: the banners of anti-Westernism, anticolonialism, and the welfare of the masses.

This one aspect of China's image in Southeast Asian eyes (the only favorable aspect) might have outweighed the two negative elements, and for a very brief period it did. From 1954 to 1958-1959 China emphasized an Asian policy of friendship and reasonableness, symbolized by Chou En-lai's masterful performance at Bandung in 1955. But by 1959 something approaching a "hard line" was reinstated, and the 1960's have seen China dissipate much of the favorable capital that it had accumulated in Southeast Asia. Her strained relations with India, Indonesia, and Burma (to say nothing of Peking's regular vilification of the Thai, Malaysian, and Filipino governments) have led many leaders in Southeast Asia to reexamine their perception of China. Many would have preferred not to see China in negative terms; they have hoped that Peking would accept a live-and-let-live approach. But China's behavior has made that view difficult to sustain, and this has been one of the prime elements leading Asians to think increasingly of ways to provide for their long-term security.²⁸ It is in that perspective that the already familiar concept of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has begun to take on new meaning recently.

China's increasing unfriendliness has provided something that the "environment" for regional cooperation has long lacked: a common perception of threat. As long as that was absent, the concept of regionalism had no special urgency. Even the idea that there might be practical benefits from regional cooperation, a belief urged for years by some economists and by the ECAFE staff,²⁹ went unheeded because there was little political reason to pay attention. Since approximately 1962-1963, however, the idea has been gaining momentum, and has now got to be recognized as one of the arresting features of the Southeast Asian political environment. There seems little doubt that one of the reasons for this change, although by no means the only or most important reason, is the realization that China cannot be regarded as a permanently passive element in Asia's affairs and may indeed become a very troublesome and active participant.

It is with this consideration in mind that Southeast Asian leaders, searching for means to improve their overall security posture, have given renewed attention to regionalism. But it must be said immediately that they do not think of regional cooperation as an input to present defense needs. No Southeast Asian leader deludes himself into believing that short-term defense requirements can be met with local resources, and all—even those not tied militarily to the US—recognize that an American military presence in the Pacific must for some years provide an indispensable security framework. But this is not seen as a comfortable or acceptable long-term arrangement; even Thai and Filipino leaders regard SEATO as a mildly distasteful though at present essential element of security. Nonmembers of SEATO would not join this or any other arrangement tied directly to the US, for their distaste for "military pacts" is even stronger.³⁰ Instead leaders in Southeast Asia see in regional cooperation a means of achieving some kind of solidarity, and although that goal was always attractive in emotional terms, cohesion in balkanized Southeast Asia has become important to them for the first time for political reasons.

Some leaders of course have no difficulty admitting that the ultimate rationale behind all this is security, and that regionalism for them represents a fundamentally political purpose. Thanat Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister, is a good illustration of this view. For many others, if not most, it is more comfortable to speak about regionalism only in economic terms, and for that reason the question of what Southeast Asian leaders expect to gain—in the shorter term—from cooperation must be asked. There is no certain answer, and some Western economists suggest that there can be no important benefits from interconnecting a series of poor, agriculture-based economies whose present mutual trade is very low and whose exportable products do not show the kind of complementarity that might lead to intraregional trade increases.

However a number of Asian economists have reached a different judgment: they have consistently urged that many benefits will come from regional cooperation. They point out that it is incorrect, albeit familiar, to look at intraregional trade as the index of potential economic regionalism. They stress instead that many of the developmental needs of Southeast Asian economies—in technical know-how, improved agricultural productivity, capital availability and infrastructure—can be met on an improved basis through intra-Asian cooperation. One of the best known of these economists, Hiroshi Kitamura of ECAFE, has long urged that the Southeast Asian economies can reap considerable

benefits from the regional "harmonization" of their industrial development programs. Several benefits might flow from this approach. First, some areas of needed industrialization (steel, fertilizers, aluminum, and so on) are so capital intensive that any one of the smaller Southeast Asian economies acting unilaterally may not be able to manage the necessary outlay. Second, the world money markets are more likely to be attracted to opportunities that—because they reflect a regional plan—are not redundant. This might be achieved, as the Governor of the Bank of Thailand has also said to this writer, if two or more countries agreed not to duplicate facilities.³¹ Finally, these and other economists believe that intra-Asian trade will increase as a result of such joint planning or harmonization.³²

Without an exhaustive economic analysis of the pros and cons of regional cooperation no one can say with any certainty whether the kinds of cooperative measures now proposed by officials within the region will bring marked improvement to the economies of the region. It is clear, however, that some leading Asian bankers and economists have been ardent proponents of the concept for some years, whereas non-Asian specialists often minimize the significance of economic cooperation among developing countries generally. Nevertheless the proposals of the Asian specialists have maintained their momentum and have helped persuade both foreign and local leaders that it is worth listening to the arguments for cooperation. One result of this indigenous momentum is that by 1965–1966 the governments of both Japan and the US began to reconsider their often negative assessments about the future prospects of regionalism.

The Asian Development Bank, for example, was suggested some years ago in ECAFE, as well as by one of Thailand's most brilliant young banker-economists.³³ The reason for these suggestions was the widespread conviction that regional cooperation was an essential aspect of accelerating the economic development goals of Southeast Asian states. Although until almost the last minute the US (speaking primarily through the Treasury Department) was cool to the idea, it suddenly reversed itself in 1965.³⁴ Japanese officials too, represented primarily by the Ministry for International Trade and Industry, were not enthusiastic about either the Bank idea or cooperation generally until quite recently. Both governments, however, now appear to be very much in support of the concept of Asian regionalism, and this support is likely to reinforce the view of those Southeast Asian leaders who have been advocates of regional cooperation for some years. Their own hunch that regionalism will have an economic payoff is strengthened by the commitment of Japan and the US each to subscribe \$200 million to the Asian Development Bank. It is an added incentive to know that leading outsiders are also in support of the concept.

It may be, finally, that outside support has been indirectly the most important of the three incentives for Asian regionalism. For even taking into account the other two—i.e., a perception of China as a threat and a belief that cooperation will aid economic development—the role the US has played in the area has been critical for the development of regionalism. The essence of this role is that the US has provided time for Southeast Asia: time for leaders to come to their own realization that China's great-power interests are a threat to their independence, and time to begin the process of restructuring the regional politics of Southeast Asia. The "long-range hope," as Thai Foreign Minister Thanat

Khoman said a few months ago, is "to build an effective Pacific community--to forge one that will be a successful deterrent to aggression."³⁵

The function that the US has performed, reflected especially in its strong determination not to lose in Vietnam, has been to show Asian leaders that there will be time to work toward this goal. The realization is now widespread among local elites that the US has made a firm and fundamental commitment in Southeast Asia, and this realization is a fact of the greatest significance. To this writer, who has met with most Southeast Asian foreign ministers on several study trips since 1962, it was the most striking finding of a recent field trip.³⁶ The extent to which the US purpose in Vietnam was understood and endorsed by these leaders was impressive, as was the connection they drew between American resolve and their own rising enthusiasm for regional cooperation. But nowhere is this better summed up than in a recent article by Denis Warner. He too found a close connection between US firmness in Vietnam and the accelerating pace of efforts aimed at Asian regionalism. "The U.S. stand in Vietnam," he wrote, "has both stimulated interest in and opened up the prospect of much closer relationships between the free Asian states." Warner (an Australian) is one of the two or three most reliable and experienced reporters in East Asia, and to emphasize his point he referred to the frank remarks of Lee Kuan Yew:

"Are you people really serious in Vietnam?" Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's acerbic and sometimes seemingly anti-American Prime Minister asked a senior Washington official. "If you are, we are with you." The conviction now that the United States is serious--and this persists despite the sound and fury of the far-off debate--has helped to stimulate an interest in regional self-help and cooperation that even the most optimistic observer could scarcely have hoped for when the Communist capture of state power in Vietnam and Indonesia seemed imminent and Communism the wave of the future throughout the area.³⁷ [Emphasis added]

While Warner may have chosen too optimistic a title for his article--"An Asian Common Market" is hardly in the offing--his conclusions are potentially reassuring. For he has found too that "instead of fretting about how to live with Communism, the Southeast Asians have now become concerned about finding a way to live with each other, conscious as never before that by hanging together they will avoid the danger of being hanged separately." (Ref 37, p 25) This is precisely what President Johnson had in mind when he said that one of the "realities of the New Asia" is the disenchantment with the "spent slogans of narrow nationalism," which has given way to Asia's new interest in "interdependence." These new developments, and new realizations, mean that the deepest purpose of a decade of US policies in Southeast Asia is now being vindicated. Costly as they have been, American actions have allowed Asians to learn two facts for themselves: that the American goal was never imperialism or "neocolonialism," and that only behind the American military shield, which so many of them denounced, has it been possible to plan for the new direction represented by Asian regional cooperation.

One measure of this accomplishment is the extent to which Southeast Asian leaders themselves now frankly assess the meaning of communism in East Asia. Although not all the region's leaders feel they can yet be as publicly candid as those in Singapore, some recent remarks of Singapore's Defense Minister are not at all atypical:

There is a widely held misconception about the nature and appeals of Communism in backward countries. . . . Communist appeal and Communist strength are sometimes believed to be the result of poverty, oppressive domestic government, or frustrated nationalism. This pays the Communist movement an undeserved compliment. . . . The Communist Party in any country has only one purpose—the revolutionary seizure of state power.³⁸ [Emphasis added]

The other measure of the American accomplishment—though most emphatically and most importantly it is an indirect accomplishment—is the new emphasis on Asian regionalism. Although the US favored and supported efforts at regional economic cooperation in the 1950's (as at Simla and occasionally in the SEATO framework), the local environment was not ready.³⁹ Consequently outside urgings were never able to make regionalism take hold during that period. Now the time very clearly is ripe, and the leadership in Asian regional cooperation is Asia's own. For this reason and because Asian regionalism is so consistent with the US objective of a multipolar Asia, it is especially important that these indigenous efforts be well understood by American planners. The next chapter is designed to help achieve that aim.

Chapter 3

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND ITS PREDECESSORS

THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The first locally sponsored Southeast Asian regional grouping was formed in 1961 as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA). In August 1967 it seemed likely that ASA might be superseded when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed. The essential difference between the two appeared to be the inclusion of Indonesia (and Singapore) in the new association. In other respects it was very probable that ASEAN would follow patterns established by ASA, because by 1967 ASA had become the most promising of all the efforts at Asian regionalism. It suffered primarily from the fact that Indonesia, the largest of the region's states, was not included. Despite that, it had established a good record and a dynamism of its own. Its activities were probably followed with more interest in Southeast Asia than those of either ASPAC or MAPHILINDO (a loose, consultative body, formed in 1963 by Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia), although those two organizations had become better known outside Asia.

ASA had its origins in 1959 when the Prime Minister of Malaysia and President Garcia of the Philippines met in Manila. In their own capitals both leaders had already expressed interest in the idea of Asian regionalism, and soon after their meeting the Malaysian leader Tun Abdul Rahman began to circulate a proposal for a Southeast Asian regional organization. For a long time little came of his efforts, although every Southeast Asian government (with the sole exception of North Vietnam) was invited to join. The idea did, however, catch the attention of the Thai government and of Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman in particular. As a result he took the lead in preparing draft proposals for the outlines of the proposed new organization, and at the same time he attempted to attract the cooperation of several other Southeast Asian governments for the proposal. He was especially interested in Burma.

These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and for a time it seemed even that Thailand might not join if the new group was to be restricted to too few governments. But by 1961 it was finally agreed that Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines would proceed anyway with its establishment, and ASA was created in a meeting held in Bangkok in July.

Purposes and Structure

ASA's experiences for the next 2 years were uneven. At the beginning the organization set itself a series of wide-ranging and in many cases very idealistic goals. There was talk of a common market, a free-trade area, and such appealing ventures as a cooperative three-nation airline and shipping line.¹ On a less grandiose level a number of meetings were held to plan for cooperating ventures in educational exchange, in the joint training of technicians in fields related to agricultural and industrial development, and in several other areas in which cooperation might be both feasible and useful in economic development. Although there was also early interest in social and cultural cooperation, it was soon clear that, aside from educational exchanges, most interest centered on projects in the economic field. This was consistent with the thoughts that President Garcia and the Tunku had in 1959: to build a regional organization for economic cooperation. As a result the most interesting planning within ASA in 1962-1963 and the subject matter that seemed to be of most interest to higher levels in each of the three nation's ministries was in fields related to economic cooperation.

By early 1963 a sufficient number of ASA meetings had taken place that its broad outlines were discernible. Its structure, for example, was developed on three separate levels. The first, the one that had given ASA its establishment initially, was an annual foreign ministers' meeting. Ordinarily the ministers have met in alternate capitals in July of each year, although there is provision for special foreign ministers' meetings. The second level of ASA's organizational structure, and the one that reports directly to the ministers, is known as the Joint Working Party. This body represents some of the most senior officials in various ministries in each of the three Southeast Asian governments, and its recommendations essentially structure the final agreements that the three ministers will conclude. For this reason the Joint Working Party ordinarily has met in April or May, and with its high-level membership it has hammered out the agreements that the ministers can later simply ratify.

But it is not even in the Joint Working Party meetings, which last for only a week or so, that the detailed discussions and examinations of cooperative projects can take place. Instead this is the function of a series of "working-level" committees. Their membership includes the experts in the respective functional fields from each of the governments. For example, some of the committees have been concerned with shipping, trade liberalization, educational procedures, marketing, and proposals for cooperation in such fields as agriculture and fisheries. Ordinarily these special committees, which represent the most pragmatic aspect of ASA planning, have met in the autumn and winter months of each year. It has been their purpose, following the ASA foreign ministers' meetings in July, to act on the mandate that they receive from the ministerial level.

Temporary Deep Freeze

This structure was becoming apparent by mid-1963, but it was at that time that ASA was forced to cease most of its operations. This cessation was caused by a Philippine territorial claim to North Borneo that served to aggravate and upset relations among leaders in Manila and Kuala Lumpur. From

the viewpoint of ASA development this was an especially poor time for an interruption, because the new organization had just completed its first year. During that year ASA underwent a "shaking down" process, and some of the most senior civil servants in each of the three governments had begun to develop pragmatic ideas of what could and what could not be accomplished within the ASA format. Because ASA represented such an unprecedented experiment in Southeast Asian communications among governments and their senior officials, this was itself no mean accomplishment. Indeed, the association was just beginning to outline some creative steps when the break came, and one of these steps was the ASA Fund.

The fund was initially subscribed at a level of \$3 million (\$1 million from each government), and it was expected that the money would be used to finance joint research projects. That too was an unprecedented development and suggested that the three governments were beginning to look on the small subregional group with genuine, if limited, expectations of accomplishment. Nevertheless all this had to come to a temporary halt in the wake of disturbed Philippines-Malaysia relations. In a sense ASA operations went into a deep freeze in mid-1963 from which they seem to have reemerged relatively unscathed in 1966.

That recovery is in itself one of the most compelling signs that regional cooperation in Southeast Asia had a certain dynamism of its own, and that ASA in particular has represented a special strain in the breed of Asian regionalism. This became very clear in 1964-1965 in discussions with foreign ministers and senior civil servants in each of the ASA nations. That was of course a period in which ASA was not operating, for by 1964 the Philippines and Malaysia had severed their diplomatic relations. Nevertheless it was the most widely held view that ASA was—in the words of one foreign minister—merely in a "hiatus."

It was confidently expected in Kuala Lumpur, in Manila, and most certainly in Bangkok that ASA would be revived quite soon. Malaysian officials in particular were at pains to point out that they had not disbanded their ASA staffs. Instead they had continued to develop plans for cooperative ventures essentially along the lines of the projects that had been agreed on when ASA formally ceased operations the year before. A similar view was expressed to me by the Foreign Minister of Thailand. While he complained that his Prime Minister had asked for the bookkeeping "return" of the \$1 million allocated to the ASA Fund, Thanat Khoman assured this writer that his Prime Minister had in turn assured him that once ASA was reestablished the \$1 million Thai contribution to the fund would be immediately restored. In sum, a temporary conflict in 1963-1965 between two of the ASA governments was not regarded, even by leaders in those governments, as sufficiently important to destroy a subregional association to which they attached great value.

Their judgment was borne out by developments after late 1965. One of these developments was the simple fact that the Philippines' claim to North Borneo had not been effective; indeed among the many Filipinos who strenuously opposed it was the senator who became President of the republic in the November 1965 elections. Ferdinand Marcos was not interested in prosecuting the claim once he became President, and about the same time developments took place in Indonesia that also led to a change in the Southeast Asian political climate. This was of course the attempted coup in Indonesia, which led over the next few months to the gradual toppling from power of President Sukarno.

As that event took place, it meant too the end of Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia, a confrontation with which the Philippine government had indirectly associated itself. Thus while events in the Philippines were already moving in the direction of a Manila-Kuala Lumpur rapprochement, that trend was facilitated by Indonesia's own cessation of its anti-Malaysian policy. Consequently it was not surprising that by mid-1966 Malaysia and the Philippines were once again speaking about reviving ASA.

ASA Revived

Accordingly in July 1966 the third ASA foreign ministers' meeting was held, following meetings a few weeks earlier of the Joint Working Party. Then during October-December 1966 a series of special committee meetings took place, designed to pick up regional planning where it had been left 3 years before. Although this study is not the appropriate place to report detailed ASA developments, two or three potentially practical aspects of ASA's resumption should be mentioned.²

One is that the \$3 million ASA Fund was reestablished; and another is that meetings began again on the plan to coordinate shipping arrangements among the three ASA nations. Although it remains true that the three countries are drastically short on locally owned vessels, they are also critically dependent for their hard-currency earnings on the price they must pay for transporting their exports of agricultural and natural commodities. This gives shipping a special urgency in their thinking. Of course it is too soon to say whether they will be able to overcome their scarcity of bottoms (which ostensibly would be required for establishing an ASA shipping line), but the nature of the subject testifies to the essentially pragmatic orientation of the ASA approach.

Finally steps were taken in 1966-1967 that suggested an ASA trade-liberalization treaty would be one of the association's early accomplishments. Although such a treaty probably would be no more than a most-favored-nation type, it would nevertheless represent in the eyes of the three participant states an important first step toward some improvement in the trade patterns now characteristic of Southeast Asia. The discussions on this subject seem also to have led to the possibility of a more far-reaching preferential agreement. ASA established an ad hoc committee on this problem in 1966, partly as a result of the worldwide interest (reflected in Geneva UN meetings on trade and development) in trade liberalization.

This special ASA committee met in October 1966 and considered a proposal for a free-trade area in a limited number of commodities. The Philippines drew up a draft "Free Trade Area Agreement," and suggested that ASA seek the further help and advice of UN specialists. Then in May 1967 an ASA-sponsored Conference of Representatives of Commerce and Industry discussed the draft with special reference to a free-trade agreement for 21 products. Immediately afterwards ASA's Subcommittee on Liberalization of Trade announced agreement on "general principles,"³ and negotiations designed to reach more detailed agreement were planned for later in 1967. Such a free-trade agreement, even in a restricted number of commodities, would go considerably beyond the most-favored-nation concept and could mark the beginning of ASA's common-market aims in Southeast Asia.

The 1966-1967 period was one of reorientation for ASA. A certain amount of momentum was necessarily lost between 1963 and 1966, and it was possible only after the end of 1967 to see clearly in which direction ASA is going. On balance, and especially considering that ASA represents such an unprecedented and Asian-originated step, ASA has to be reckoned something of a success. The largest measure of its success is that the widening of Southeast Asian regional cooperation—a development reflected by ASEAN—seems to be heavily based on the patterns established by ASA.

That widening began after late 1966 when Indonesia—with Thailand—began to propose a group first known as SEAARC, or Southeast Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.⁴ This was a welcome development since to a certain extent ASA has suffered in the eyes of many Asian observers because of its limited membership and especially because its three members were all Western-associated nations. It has always been the hope of the government of Thailand, as mentioned earlier, to attract the support and participation of Burma. Similarly the Malaysian government, which initially invited all other Southeast Asian states to join, had particularly hoped that Indonesia would be willing to participate. In 1959, however, when that invitation was tendered, President Sukarno was in no mood to associate himself with such governments as those in Thailand and the Philippines; instead, as he wrote to the Malaysian Prime Minister, he was interested in "Afro-Asian cooperation."⁵

But Indonesia's views on Asian regional cooperation have not remained constant; indeed, they have shifted rather dramatically in the last half-dozen years. One of the clearest illustrations of this shift is that Indonesia has joined with the three ASA nations in establishing ASEAN. It will probably be most useful to discuss first, however, the other instance of Indonesian participation in Asian regionalism—the MAPHILINDO approach.

MAPHILINDO

Occasionally since 1966, as reports have circulated throughout Southeast Asia that Indonesia was contemplating membership in a new regional group, observers have sometimes thought that MAPHILINDO in some variant form might be revived. This was never probable, for MAPHILINDO, quite unlike ASA, has been a dead letter almost from its beginning. The reason is that MAPHILINDO was a very artificial creation, made possible only by the temporary circumstances surrounding the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation and the Philippines' claim to North Borneo. It was a hasty patchwork job, and its history is much in contrast to the slow evolutionary development that characterized ASA. This contrast is illustrated best by recalling the circumstances that gave rise to the establishment of MAPHILINDO in June of 1963.

Origins of MAPHILINDO

More than a year earlier in Manila, President Macapagal received from the University of the Philippines a special study that dealt with a "Greater Malaya Federation." The study was in response to a presidential request addressed to GEN Romulo (head of the university) in early 1962. Macapagal

had asked the university to examine the prospects for federation or confederation proposals in Southeast Asia, not because he was primarily interested in Asian regionalism but because he was searching for a way to head off the British-sponsored idea for a Malaysia federation. The British proposal, he recognized, would vastly complicate his own claim to North Borneo, which was to become part of the new Malaysia federation as the state of Sabah. Thus a faculty committee was asked to examine the implications of the Malaysia proposal as it would affect the Philippines.

The committee responded with an endorsement of Macapagal's federation concept. They recommended that he propose a "confederation" to include Malaya and the Philippines in the hope that this would prevent the loss of North Borneo. Their reasoning is reflected in this excerpt from their report to the president:

As far as the Philippines is concerned, [Malaysia's] formation would mean the transfer of sovereignty over North Borneo from the United Kingdom to the new federation. . . . This would complicate our North Borneo claim by the coming in of a new party or, at the worst, would mean the forfeiture of that claim.

This clearly leaves two courses of action, which are not mutually exclusive, that the Philippines can pursue. One course of action is already being pursued: i.e., President Macapagal's confederation proposal. This course of action would be fruitful provided it succeeds in superseding, or preventing the formation of, the Federation of Malaysia, as the President apparently intended. The idea is twofold; (1) to prevent the British from unilaterally transferring sovereignty over North Borneo to a federation which excludes the Philippines; and (2) to keep open the avenue to a negotiated settlement of the status of North Borneo.⁶ [Emphasis added]

Clearer proof could hardly be found that the Philippines' idea for a confederation was based not on any genuine interest in Asia's regionalism but on a clearly self-serving interest in a territorial claim. Soon afterwards, moreover, the Philippines' proposal was given added currency when Indonesia late in 1962 embarked on its "confrontation with Malaysia."

When that happened President Macapagal went back to the university and asked for an amended study, this time to take into account his proposal for an enlarged confederation. This would include not only the Philippines and Malaya but Indonesia as well. The university soon responded with a plan for what later became known as the Greater Malayan Confederation. This proposal with very small alterations appeared a few months later as MAPHILINDO. Among the possible confederation outlines that the university forwarded to President Macapagal was one called "Plan C"; President Macapagal dubbed Plan C the "Macapagal Plan" and submitted it at the 1963 Manila Summit Conference for the consideration of Malaysia and Indonesia.

The Macapagal Plan called for the establishment of a loose consultative committee, or group of the three "Malay" nations, for the purpose of achieving cooperation along economic, social, and ultimately political lines. With little change it was this plan that soon afterwards became MAPHILINDO. Indeed, a side-by-side comparison of the Macapagal Plan with the organizational structure of MAPHILINDO shows that they are the same, just as a comparison of the university's Plan C alongside the Macapagal Plan shows that they too are almost identical. Whatever validity was in the plan, however, had little or nothing to do with the fact that it was ultimately adopted by President Sukarno of Indonesia and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia.

Instead the reason that the plan was adopted and MAPHILINDO established derived almost altogether from two elements: the jackal-like policies towards Malaya that both Indonesia and the Philippines were then pursuing, and from the desire of the Malayan government somehow to mollify its two Malay "brothers." As was pointed out above, Manila's desire to prevent the incorporation of North Borneo into Malaysia led Macapagal to propose MAPHILINDO in the first place. The Indonesian government for its part was prepared to go along with this Philippine initiative largely because Sukarno and Foreign Minister Subandrio believed that their support would encourage President Macapagal to continue in his anti-Malaysian policy. Foreign Minister Subandrio in a July 1963 conversation with this writer stressed that he had little or no enthusiasm for the MAPHILINDO idea and did not believe that it would amount to anything. On the other hand, as he said, "If it is good domestic politics for Macapagal, we don't mind."⁷

Two Benefits from MAPHILINDO

Given these opportunistic and expedient circumstances it should not be surprising that MAPHILINDO never amounted to much. On the other hand, because the circumstances surrounding MAPHILINDO's establishment have not been sufficiently well-known, the significance of MAPHILINDO has been misunderstood. In the main, its significance lies in the fact that Indonesia participated in it at all, but at the time observers misread Djakarta's reasons for joining. Some, including British and American officials, speculated that an anti-Chinese alliance was in the making. There is some evidence that Indonesian officials, when describing MAPHILINDO to diplomatic colleagues, allowed themselves to be understood in this way. Yet little in their behavior at the time, nor even during the ensuing 2 years for that matter, would support this interpretation of the purposes of MAPHILINDO.⁸ Instead it has to be concluded that from Indonesia's viewpoint the establishment of MAPHILINDO was essentially part of her confrontation policy against Malaysia. When the MAPHILINDO format failed to produce a Malaysian willingness to accept Indonesian demands, Indonesia resorted to armed force in pursuance of her policy. Later, in February and July 1964, when negotiations to bring an end to the hostilities were undertaken, they were not undertaken under the MAPHILINDO rubric. Instead they were arranged by parties altogether removed from that approach: by the then Attorney General Robert Kennedy of the US, by Thailand's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, and by officials in the Japanese government. Partly as a result of that nonuse MAPHILINDO has been little heard from since 1964.

Moreover it has to be stressed that not only did MAPHILINDO not contribute much but that it had some negative results as well. The unfortunate experiences that the Malaysian government had with Indonesia during the MAPHILINDO period, for example, have left her leaders extremely reluctant to again accept the idea of Indonesian participation in regional cooperation. The negotiations that finally led to ASEAN in August 1967 were clearly bedeviled by the Tunku's negative recollections of MAPHILINDO. He has tended to compare MAPHILINDO unfavorably with ASA, which he was so largely responsible for creating, and which was able to show some measure of practical accomplishment. MAPHILINDO, on the other hand, never got down to the business of planning for joint ventures in the way that ASA did. In addition MAPHILINDO

represents to the Malaysian government a period in which the Philippines and Indonesia almost literally "ganged up on" Malaysia. Inevitably this left some bitter memories in Kuala Lumpur, directed against not only Indonesia but the Philippines as well.

Strangely, however, MAPHILINDO caught the attention of outsiders, especially in the West, more than ASA ever did. The explanation lies in the two relatively useful by-products of MAPHILINDO. One of these is that Indonesia's participation did represent a change in Djakarta's policy, for until 1963 her leaders had carefully avoided anything that smacked of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The utility of this by-product became apparent during 1966-1967, the period when President Sukarno was being gradually toppled. For it was possible for his successors during that uncertain time to speak about and work for regional cooperation without having to break entirely new ground.

The second useful by-product of the MAPHILINDO experience is external and relates to others' perceptions of Indonesia. The dramatic Manila Summit talks, which gave birth to MAPHILINDO, reminded observers once again of Djakarta's importance in the region. More specifically MAPHILINDO helped to bring home the point that without Indonesian participation any effort at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia—such as was represented by ASA—would at best be a limited achievement.

That thought led to the conclusion in 1965 that because of Indonesia's potentially destabilizing role in the region, the approaches symbolized by both ASA and MAPHILINDO should be combined. In a final chapter called "Prospects for Stability in Southeast Asia," (Ref 1, pp 191-92) this writer concluded that "stability in the region probably would be enhanced if Indonesia became regularly associated with a continuing regional organization." Such a merging, it seemed likely, might help "to internalize the role of Indonesia within the system of Southeast Asia's international politics." It was felt then that although the ASA experience represented a concern for pragmatism and economic development clearly essential for successful cooperation the MAPHILINDO approach also had advantages. The most important of these obviously was Indonesian participation itself, but it was also felt that Indonesian participation in a new subregional grouping might encourage such nonaligned states as Burma and Cambodia to consider their own ultimate involvement in the concept.

Because the then Indonesian government under Sukarno was given to slogans and popular acronyms, and also because the Indonesian government has represented such a dynamic element in Southeast Asian affairs, the outlines of such a new group were predictable. For example, it was appropriate to expect that a certain amount of Indonesia's special imprint could not be avoided if her participation was to be achieved. Such a group, had it been established for example in 1965, might have been called something like "ASA-NEFOS." That title would have taken into account Sukarno's acronym for the "New Emerging Forces," but the reason for suggesting ASA-NEFOS as a name was more important than the name itself. The reason was to stress the importance of Indonesia's concern for the style and image of any regional group with which it could associate itself.⁹

Not ASA-NEFOS, of course, but ASEAN was established—on 8 August 1967. ASEAN is indeed precisely the merging of MAPHILINDO and ASA that it seemed logical to suggest 2 years before. The text of the ASEAN Declaration

shows that it will have a structure much like that of ASA, and its purposes—even including its affirmation “that all foreign bases are temporary”—reflect the imprint of Sukarno and Subandrio on the Manila Declaration and MAPHILINDO 4 years earlier. Because of this merging, ASEAN represents perhaps the most promising Southeast Asian development in years, and the developments that led to its creation should be examined.

THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS

For several months before ASEAN was formally established in August 1967, it was informally referred to throughout the region as SEAARC.¹⁰ Its potential significance lies primarily in the fact that it can combine Indonesia and the three ASA nations in a subregional group that also includes Singapore. Such a combination of Southeast Asian states represents a total population of at least 180 million; and if it develops along the pragmatic lines suggested by the ASA model, it can become a significant factor in East Asian international affairs. But to understand ASEAN's potential as well as the problems it faces, it will be helpful first to describe some of the circumstances that led several governments to propose it.

Background of ASEAN

The idea for a new Southeast Asian group can be traced primarily to the new Indonesian government, in particular Foreign Minister Adam Malik. Malik, as soon as he came to power as part of the triumvirate led by GEN Suharto, was inclined to achieve a relatively sharp break from Indonesia's policies of the immediate past. As part of this inclination Malik was in the forefront of those who were urging President Sukarno's removal from power, and as a further part of the same tendency he was anxious to bring about a quick end to President Sukarno's “confrontation” with Malaysia. The final element in his desire to reshape the foreign image of Indonesia has seemed to be Malik's strong personal interest in the concept of Asian—especially Southeast Asian—regional cooperation. But it was the task of ending confrontation, which required many talks with the Malaysians (directly and through intermediaries), that allowed Malik to express his goal of incorporating Indonesia into the region's developing pattern of cooperative efforts.

The opportunity to express these sentiments began late in 1965 and continued through the early months of 1966, as Indonesian officials inaugurated a series of informal “peace feelers” with the Malaysians. The confrontation itself came to a formal end in talks convened in Bangkok in June 1966, and it is likely that Malik's views were communicated even earlier.¹¹ It is certain, however, that “regional cooperation” was one of the agenda items when formal talks took place under Thanat's auspices, partly in reflection of his interest in the subject as well.¹² At the time their thoughts seem to have focused on ASA as at least the format for cooperation, but in deference to a widespread Indonesian mythology that ASA is a “Western” concept Malik probably proposed that a “new” group be formed in its place. Indeed, it is typical of Malik's style that after reaching the agreement to end confrontation and as he left Bangkok for Djakarta he announced at the airport that the three ASA countries had already decided to join his proposed new group.¹³

This estimate was premature, and the reaction of the Thai and Malaysian representatives also present at the Bangkok airport suggested what was to become their governments' approach to this subject during the entire following year. Thanat Khoman, for example, confirmed "in principle" what Malik had said and gave it his hearty endorsement. A senior representative of the Malaysian embassy on the other hand confined himself to saying that "proposals have been made." There is no record of any Philippine reaction to the proposal at that early date, but shortly afterward both Philippine Foreign Secretary Ramos and Thanat Khoman went to Djakarta. On both occasions the statements that Malik and his visitors released said quite plainly that Indonesian participation in regional cooperation was on the agenda.¹⁴ There were some problems, but as the Thai Foreign Minister stressed in October he expected a format would be found for Indonesian participation in an Asian group.¹⁵ At about the same time the Indonesian Foreign Minister also stressed that his government was pressing for Indonesian involvement in regionalism, and he appeared to be quite sanguine about its prospects.¹⁶ There was in that period no indication that either the Philippines or Malaysian government was giving top priority to this subject, and it appeared that there were probably some divergencies of view. Some of these were probably substantively based, but others may have been founded more on prestige considerations.

For example, it seemed unlikely that Indonesia, whose leaders have generally regarded their nation as the inevitably dominant (or at least leading) state in Southeast Asia, would "ask" for admission to a new regional group. In Indonesian eyes such a request would have too much of the appearance of humbling oneself before Malaysians and Filipinos, and in 1966 there was a special reason to be anxious about such things. Sukarno's reaction had to be considered, for it has to be remembered that until early 1967 (until March at least) Sukarno was still in a position of titular authority in Indonesia. Until he was finally "toppled" it was still reasonable to fear that he or his supporters might stage a comeback to power, and GEN Suharto's government had to be anxious about steps that could take on the appearance of aligning Indonesia too closely with Western-associated nations. Sukarno might seize on such a step, for he was throughout early 1966 bitterly opposing the cessation of the confrontation policy.¹⁷ This domestic environment in Indonesia had the effect throughout 1966 of limiting the foreign-policy latitude of Malik and GEN Suharto. There continued to be an anxiety in Indonesia that the nation's new leaders—having pulled Indonesia out of the pro-Peking Asian camp—might fall into the other error of pushing Indonesia into the pro-Western camp. As long as Sukarno continued to exercise a position of public prominence and especially as long as his words were attentively listened to, any steps that seemed to place Indonesia in close ties with such SEATO allies as Thailand and the Philippines had therefore to be very carefully formulated.

These considerations placed the Indonesian leadership in something of a dilemma. Although Foreign Minister Malik and some members of the Indonesian military leadership wished to associate the nation with some form of Southeast Asian regional cooperation, they had to avoid the appearance of aiming too fervently towards this goal. A way out of the dilemma was apparently seized on by late summer 1966, probably as a result of the talks between Adam Malik and Thanat Khoman. The Thai leader arrived in Djakarta at the

end of August; and whereas part of his visit was in connection with searchings for a Vietnam solution, regional cooperation too was very much on the agenda.¹⁸ The Thai minister said that he was visiting Djakarta to discuss both bilateral and Southeast Asian matters, and when he was asked whether that meant SEATO he said emphatically, "I did not come here to discuss SEATO."

Indeed only several days before this visit the Foreign Secretary of the Philippines, Narciso Ramos, had also visited Foreign Minister Malik in Djakarta. Their joint statement reaffirmed "the importance and urgency of meaningful regional cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia, especially in the economic, social, technical, and cultural field."¹⁹ Given this background, and given too the fact that Thanat Khoman is known both for his extraordinary negotiating ability and for his strong personal interest in Southeast Asian regionalism, it seems quite certain that much of his discussion with Adam Malik was oriented to that subject. Both ministers shared an interest in furthering the concept, but the question was who would act and when.

The approach that the two leaders apparently agreed on called for Malik to make his views known to Thanat Khoman, who would then circulate to the ASA members a Thai invitation to join in a new regional organization. The invitation would be drafted and sent out by the Thai government, and this procedure would avoid the necessity for Indonesia to "ask" for ASA membership. The invitation would also probably benefit from the prestige with which the Thai Foreign Minister is regarded both in Malaysia and the Philippines. It has to be remembered, after all, that he not only was instrumental in the Indonesia-Malaysia talks during confrontation but he also served as an informal link between Manila and Kuala Lumpur when those two states were squabbling over North Borneo.

The SEAARC Proposal

Accordingly, in late 1966 (probably in December) a communication was sent from Bangkok, addressed to the leaders in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The message took the form of a "Draft Joint Declaration," which it was hoped would be signed shortly afterward by the minister of foreign affairs in each of the states involved and would result in a new four-nation regional organization. (At this stage Singapore, a non-member of ASA, was probably not contacted formally.) The likely outlines of the proposed body were suggested in this draft joint declaration, and although it has not yet been published, it was made available to this writer while in Southeast Asia. The essence of the document can be summed up by saying that it represented a careful and conscious blending of the purposes of ASA along with much of the style and flavor of MAPHILINDO.

This is seen best in some of the wording designed to express the purposes of the new group. The preamble is distinctly reminiscent of the phrases incorporated more than 3 years earlier in the Manila Declaration, and it is generally recognized that those sentiments—in contrast to the organizational format of MAPHILINDO—owed much of their inspiration to former Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio. For example, when Subandrio came to Manila in June 1963 and met with the Malayan and Philippine Foreign Ministers, the three issued a Report, which in its first substantive article declared: "The ministers were of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for

the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation. . . .²⁰ A few weeks later (at the end of July 1963) Sukarno himself went to Manila and placed the Indonesian imprint even more clearly on the results of the Manila meetings. Although Subandrio had already done a good job and had succeeded in having the other two foreign ministers agree to these Indonesian views on local responsibility for Southeast Asian security, Sukarno apparently wanted a specific reference to foreign bases. As a result even stronger phrases were incorporated after Sukarno had met with the Malaysian and Philippine leaders. They agreed to words on foreign bases unlike anything their governments had ever said before, and it is very instructive to see how those 1963-style Indonesian sentiments have stood the test of time. They are almost identical to the words that Thanat Khoman of Thailand used in his 1966 and 1967 drafts that led to ASEAN. The 1963 Declaration read in part:

The three heads of government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers. [Refs 1, pp 100-04; 20, p 29]

In comparison, Thanat Khoman began his new "Draft Declaration" with these words:

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia. . . [and] Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. . . and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. . . [of] Thailand. . . .

Believing that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the area. . . .

Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of Asian countries, and that arrangements of collective defense should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers. . . .²¹

If a side-by-side comparison is made of the texts of MAPHILINDO, SEAARC, and ASEAN the origins of at least the preamble of the new Southeast Asian group will be very clear. Such a comparison is shown in Fig. 2, and the similarity between Thailand's SEAARC proposal and documents of the MAPHILINDO period obviously could not be overlooked either in Manila or in Kuala Lumpur. The important reason for borrowing so much from the MAPHILINDO sentiments, at least in the preamble, was to ensure Indonesia's participation. At the same time the SEAARC proposal, which has in fact since become ASEAN, did not borrow very much from MAPHILINDO other than the preamble. For the rest of it, especially the structure of the body and its purposes, it seems quite clear that ASA rather than MAPHILINDO was the model. This combination, which the writer suggested in 1965 could be called "ASANEFOS," was precisely what had seemed necessary to attract Indonesian participation.²²

Nevertheless it is clear that Thanat Khoman's concern to use words acceptable to Indonesia led leaders in Manila and Kuala Lumpur to raise a number

of questions about his SEAARC proposal. This is despite the fact that the purposes of the new organization, and some of the projects it would first examine, came clearly from the ASA experience and are hardly objectionable. For example, the Declaration states that among its purposes will be the following: to "strengthen regional peace and security," to promote "cooperation in Southeast Asian studies," and to provide for "cooperation in technical training and research and for improving intraregional trade." Though almost anything could reasonably be subsumed under such broad injunctions, the responses to the Thai initiative were not immediately favorable.

MAPHILINDO	SEAARC	ASEAN
Manila Accord 31 July 1963	Draft December 1966-January 1967	Declaration 8 August 1967
The Mii. stars were of one mind that the three countries share a primary responsibility for the maintenance of the stability and security of the area from subversion in any form or manifestation....	Believing that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for ensuring the stability and maintaining the security of the area....	Considering that the countries of Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities....
Manila Declaration 5 August 1963	Being in agreement that foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers....	Affirming that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of states in the area....
The three heads of government further agreed that foreign bases—temporary in nature—should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries....		

Fig. 2—Comparison of MAPHILINDO, SEAARC, and ASEAN Texts, Showing Origin of ASEAN Preamble

The Philippine government, for example, denied for some time that it was even in receipt of a proposal for a new regional organization. In a number of conversations that participants in this study had with the most senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Manila, including the Foreign Secretary, it was steadfastly maintained that Manila knew nothing of the SEAARC proposal. These conversations were held in January 1967, and it is understood that efforts by officials of the US Embassy, also designed to elicit a reaction to the SEAARC proposal, were equally unsatisfactory.

The reasons for this Philippine reaction fall probably into three categories. First it may still have been the belief in Manila that as long as President Sukarno retained some possibility of returning to power it might prove simply impractical to plan too far ahead with the Suharto government. (This was the view expressed to the writer, for example, by Under Secretary Collantes in

the Department of Foreign Affairs.) The second reason for Philippine reticence probably lay in a desire by President Marcos to create an Asian regional organization that would clearly bear his imprint. President Garcia, after all, had in 1959 and 1961 been instrumental in the creation of ASA, and President Macapagal, as shown earlier, was responsible more than any other man for the creation of MAPHILINDO in 1963. But what of Marcos? It is a widely held notion in the Philippines that the Manila government should do more to create an Asian "identity" for itself, and President Marcos may have wished to do more than merely follow on the heels of Thailand and Indonesia.

This is not mere speculation, for almost a year before the combined Indonesian-Thai proposal was made late in 1966 the Philippine government had already begun to rethink the entire ASA and MAPHILINDO approach. One illustration is in a memorandum that Foreign Secretary Ramos sent to President Marcos early in January 1966, shortly after the new President took office. Ramos wrote to the President that "if it is intended to divorce from the past and from existing rivalries in Southeast Asia power politics, there seems to be a need for a fresh approach to Asian problems under the new administration." Ramos went on to write, after mentioning the creation of the Asian Development Bank and its headquarters in Manila:

The fact remains, however, that with the prospective resumption of normal relations between the Philippines and Malaysia, the reactivation of the ASA will become a pressing issue. While the Philippines is committed to all that the ASA stands for, it would not be to its national interest to pronounce a sentence of doom for MAPHILINDO, which Indonesia might construe as a rebuff against her.

Hence, it seems rather advisable if in favoring its reactivation, ASA should be spelled out as a transitory arrangement, a stepping stone, towards the formation toward the organization of Asian states, with a call for wider collective action to achieve Asian progress.²³ [Emphasis added]

These considerations may help to explain in part why President Marcos was cool to the ideas that were represented by SEAARC and that have in turn led to ASEAN. He has not wanted to be upstaged by others, and that is what the combined Thanat-Malik proposals tended to do. But his government has also had some "legitimate" reservations, at least to the SEAARC proposal as originally designed. This reservation is probably the third explanation for the coolness to SEAARC that characterized Manila's reaction between January and August 1967. It relates to the SEAARC phrases dealing with foreign bases and security.

It will be remembered, for example, that the Manila Declaration said that foreign bases are "temporary in nature," and that even that terminology was something of a departure for Philippine public statements. The SEAARC proposal went further and stressed that "collective defense" arrangements "should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers. . . ." This terminology was probably more than President Marcos has been prepared to accept, for it can be read as too clearly an indictment of the Philippines' membership in SEATO as well as Manila's very important bilateral ties with the US. Whatever the case, it is clear that President Marcos was not overjoyed with the SEAARC concept, and ASEAN as finally agreed on in August makes no reference to collective defense arrangements.

In Kuala Lumpur early reactions to the SEAARC proposal were not much warmer than in Manila, but there was an important difference. The Tunku, perhaps in contrast to some of his advisers, took the position that no new regional organization was needed—that ASA was fine and that if Indonesia wanted to join ASA she was welcome to apply. This is best seen in a letter that the Tunku drafted early in January 1967 in response to Thanat Khoman's proposal.

While thanking the Thai Minister for the suggestions and the proposed "draft declaration," he began his reply with the phrase, "I have certain grave misgivings. . . ." The Tunku went on, moreover, to caution about the dangers of associating too closely with Indonesia: "As long as Sukarno is there. . . it would be dangerous for us to embark on such an enterprise." But his letter made it clear that more was involved in his negative response than merely doubt of Sukarno's role and his potential return to power (still an anxiety in early 1967). For the Tunku took pains to reaffirm in this letter his enthusiasm and interest in ASA; he wrote to Thanat that "I would not like to see us sacrifice ASA. . . to create a wider regional association, which I am convinced in the present circumstances has little chance of success." He added, finally, that although it was a noble goal to somehow try to help Indonesia (and the stability of the region too) by incorporating her into a new regional group, this could be a mixed blessing. The Tunku apparently felt that Indonesia's own interests and behavior patterns might so diverge from those of the three ASA nations that the risks involved in a new regional group might outweigh any potential benefits. For among other things, he reminded the Thai Foreign Ministry, "Indonesia's behavior has been to leave any organization when and as it suits her."²⁴

These are quite obviously the views of a leader who was badly burned by experiences with Indonesia and especially with President Sukarno. Indeed, even after Sukarno's apparently final downfall in March 1967 the reaction of the Malaysian government to the SEAARC proposal continued to be uncertain. To the extent that it focuses on regional cooperation, a genuine attachment for the ASA concept has seemed to dominate Malaysian thinking. A number of senior Malaysian officials have expressed their belief that it might be foolish to do away with ASA for the mere hope of another, and untried, organization.²⁵ Some have said simply that if Indonesia wanted to participate in regional cooperation, then they should make the decision to join ASA. That, however, was an altogether unrealistic prospect, as Foreign Minister Adam Malik made increasingly clear in the few months before ASEAN was established.

Malik's Role and Malaysian Reactions

Malik began a series of official visits throughout Southeast Asia during April and May 1967 in a trip that had two purposes. The first, symbolized by visits he or a senior deputy (Anwar Seni) made to Cambodia and Burma, was the hope of gaining nonaligned membership in the proposed SEAARC group—or at least nonopposition from those governments. The second, reflected in the longer stops Malik made in Manila and Bangkok, was to get the new group started. During April, for example, while he was briefly in Bangkok he was asked to comment on rumors that a new grouping was being proposed; he announced flatly that preparations for it "are almost complete."²⁶ He added that the new grouping would be wider in scope than ASA; would cover economic,

technical, and cultural fields, and would be "more perfect than MAPHILINDO." Indonesia's own press service, reporting on Malik's talks in Bangkok, suggested that Thanat Khoman was also predicting that a new group would soon be created. The Thai leader, Djakarta's news agency added, also had "pointed out that the new regional organization had nothing to do with the Association of Southeast Asia."²⁷

These indications from both Bangkok and Djakarta that ASA was likely to be shelved when the new regional grouping was established apparently provoked a reaction in Malaysia. The Tunku was reported in mid-April to have "rejected the Indonesian proposal to set up a new Southeast Asia organization," and instead to have "repeated an invitation to Indonesia to join the already existing ASA."²⁸ The same report went on to quote the Tunku's remarks as follows: "We already have ours. I don't see any need for setting up another. We have got to make ASA a success and make it serve our needs before embarking on another organization."²⁹ This interesting turn of events, occurring just a few months before ASEAN was actually established, prompted another of those instances in Malaysian politics in which the Tunku's remarks were later corrected—usually by one of his deputies. In this instance an unnamed foreign ministry spokesman announced that Malaysia was in fact ready to consider Indonesia's new proposal, and that although Kuala Lumpur felt that the logical framework for the new organization would be an expanded version of ASA, Malaysia "would not insist upon this." Immediately afterward the Malaysian Minister for Home Affairs, Tun Ismail, specifically pointed out that Malaysia was not opposed to the Indonesian proposal: "Regional cooperation has always been our policy. . . . If we can have a bigger group to bring in more countries then it's all right."³⁰

These conflicting statements from Kuala Lumpur suggest a dichotomy not only on the subject of regionalism but on Indonesia's role in Southeast Asian affairs generally—a dichotomy that has afflicted Malaysian political thinking for almost the entire 2 years since the attempted Indonesian coup. For in the wake of that coup and as Sukarno's star began its fall, the Malaysian Prime Minister has been subject to competing influences in shaping his own nation's foreign policy. On the one hand the Tunku's own inclination throughout 1966—and apparently even through mid-1967—has been to continue to suspect Indonesia and her foreign-policy behavior. This sentiment is clearly reflected in his draft letter of January 1967 as well as in his remarks throughout the spring. The Tunku seemed to be saying that if Indonesia is to be reinvolvement in Southeast Asia's politics, then she must somehow win her way back to acceptance by her neighbors. As an example of that effort, he has implied, Indonesia should have asked to be admitted to ASA.

The more dominant theme in Malaysian political circles, on the other hand, has been that which has sought to warmly welcome back Indonesia as a temporarily erring brother. In the months immediately following the Gestapu (an acronym developed from the Indonesian terms for "30th September") affair, for example, when it seemed evident that the confrontation would shortly come to a formal end, some officials in Kuala Lumpur appeared quite ready, almost eager, to promote greatly improved relations with Indonesia. Thus, when Indonesian officials visited Malaya informally in the spring of 1966 (soon after GEN Suharto began to consolidate his power in Djakarta), the Indonesian delegation was met in Kuala Lumpur with what amounted to red-carpet treatment.

Indeed, there was much heady talk then of the rejoining of "blood brothers," and on the occasion of one of these visits crowds of Malays turned out to welcome the visiting Indonesian officials. The tone set by that welcome has been characteristic of many other aspects of Malaysia's reaction to Sukarno's downfall.

It was not long after confrontation ceased, for example, that a wide range of official visits between the two countries resumed with the purpose of re-connecting some of the ties broken 3 years earlier. Some of these ties are potentially quite important; for example, the scholarly groups in Malaysia that are concerned with developing the national language Bahasa Malayu must and do look to Indonesia for leadership, and their meetings have resumed. Similarly a series of meetings among defence officials have taken place with a view to regularizing joint patrolling activities.³¹

But the important thing to note about these meetings is that quite often the initiative for joint Malaysian-Indonesian talks comes from the Malaysian side, and this reflects one of the most compelling attributes of Malaysian political life: the fact that Indonesia is looked to almost as a cultural fatherland. This is especially pronounced among Malay-speaking members of society, including particularly those who regard Malaysia's Chinese (and even Malaysia's English-speaking Malays) as a threat to the rights and prerogatives of the Malay community. This group has powerful political support, support that is not always in firm allegiance to the Tunku's moderate and tolerant style of government. This is part of the reason why the Tunku's coolness to Indonesia and his opposition to Malik's efforts to create ASEAN were likely from the beginning to fail. But there are other reasons, and one of the most important is that in the Malaysian bureaucracy, including the Foreign Ministry, there was little support for the Tunku's insistence that Indonesia be persuaded to join ASA. It was instead far more common to hear senior Malaysian officials recommending a close connection with Indonesia, and if that meant accepting Malik's proposals for a new regional organization, then that too should be accepted.³²

Yet as late as June 1967 the Tunku was reported still cool to the SEAARC proposal (Ref 8, p 11-12); the fact that Malaysia finally accepted the idea and joined in the establishment of ASEAN in August suggests that the Tunku has recognized the difficulty of "standing aside" from current trends in the region. As has been suggested, one of these current trends is that many Malays—despite the Konfrontasi (Indonesia's term for her policy of confrontation)—want very much to achieve close ties with Indonesia. Another important consideration is that Malaysian officials have regarded Thailand as a close and reliable friend, and it seems clear that Thanat Khoman's deep interest in Southeast Asian regionalism was very important in winning the Tunku's acceptance of the ASEAN idea.

Meaning of ASEAN

The establishment of ASEAN in August 1967 represents a development of major significance in postwar Asian affairs. As this study is completed (autumn 1967) it is of course too soon to know what precise directions the new organization will take or what its level of success will be. But certain points are clear, and these should be highlighted.

First it must be said that ASEAN represents a very large change in the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy. For the first time it is possible to expect that the considerable foreign-policy energies and ambitions of Indonesia can be interfused within the region. Moreover, her participation in ASEAN opens up the possibility of constructive collaboration with states that have had quite successful experience in the problems of rapid economic development. Thailand, Malaysia, and to some extent Singapore have built a body of experience about development that can be of assistance to Indonesia.³³ Second it is clear that while the ASEAN Declaration bears much of the imprint of MAPHILINDO, the "aims and purposes of the Association" are directed at quite pragmatic goals. Of the seven purposes of the association, most aim for cooperation in fields directly related to developmental needs:

3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the education, professional, technical and administrative spheres;
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living standards of their people;
6. To promote South-East Asian studies; and
7. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian nations.³⁴

These stated purposes are near-identical to those of ASA, and it is altogether likely that ASEAN will gradually subsume or incorporate ASA activities. As this is written the formal future of ASA is uncertain, and at least the Malaysian government may not wish to see ASA come to a formal end in the very near future.

At the same time it will be ludicrous to proceed for very long with ASA activities that are identical with some of the aims of ASEAN (for example in technical cooperation). Each of the Southeast Asian governments has already expressed some anxiety about duplication, partly for the simple reason that attendance at regional planning sessions drains administrative resources that no one of these governments can readily spare. For this reason, and also because ASEAN represents all the Southeast Asian governments that are likely to participate in regional cooperation for some time, ASA will probably be allowed simply to wither away.

It has to be recognized, however, that both the Malaysian and Philippine governments have had some misgivings about ASEAN, and the withering away of ASA will be to some extent dependent on the new association's showing signs of accomplishment. This gives ASEAN's first year or two a particular importance. In the face of doubts already expressed by the Tunku and the relatively low enthusiasm of President Marcos for ASEAN there is a danger that Indonesia and Thailand will face an "I told you so" attitude if the new association proceeds too slowly. Thanat Khoman is no doubt acutely aware of this, and it is to be expected that both he and Malik will aim to achieve concrete progress during 1968-1969.

One manifestation of this aim will be to continue along a direction begun when ASA itself was reactivated in 1966. It was agreed then that the help of the UN and other "experts" would be sought for activities on which ASA had agreed to embark. One of these, for example, was in the field of joint shipping arrangements, and it is likely that ASEAN will similarly seek the assistance of outsiders. The most likely first contacts will be to the Asian Development Bank and ECAFE, but it should also be expected that US assistance will be sought.

Finally it remains to be pointed out that the establishment of ASEAN means that the patterns of the intraregional politics in Southeast Asia are about to witness some very significant alterations. Some strains that ASEAN caused for Malaysia have been explained, and it will be useful at this point to state briefly certain considerations that affect some of the other participants.

FOREIGN POLICIES: KONFRONTASI TO ASEAN

Singapore

In the immediate wake of Singapore's separation from Malaysia, the government of Lee Kuan Yew took steps that sought to give the impression of new foreign-policy directions. There was much talk of modeling policies after the pattern set by Prince Sihanouk, and steps were taken to develop trade ties with both the Soviet Union and China.³⁵ These efforts were accompanied by the signing of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in April 1966. At about the same time, however, the ineluctable facts of Singapore's location and existence began to make it clear that Singapore has very little foreign-policy latitude. The one event that forced a rethinking, if in fact Prime Minister Lee really had considered a realigned policy, was the end of the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation.

The end of Konfrontasi meant several things for Singapore. One was the likelihood that a reduction in British defense deployments in the Far East, which was being planned even before 1963, was once again a likelihood. Indeed, the Bangkok talks between Indonesia and Malaysia had hardly begun when reports from London suggested that withdrawals were already being considered.³⁶ The immediate meaning for Singapore was the prospect of a sharp decline in the island's income—for as much as 25 percent of Singapore's economy can be traced to expenditures at the base structure.³⁷

The second impact was also economic, for as Konfrontasi came to an end, and despite some hopes in Singapore, Indonesia was in no great hurry to again become dependent on Singapore's entrepôt facilities. Small and essential (from Djakarta's viewpoint) ties were restored, but the stagnation of the Singapore economy that had set in at the time of confrontation was not relieved. The incomplete state of its industrial development program at Jurong and its unemployment figure of 80,000³⁸ were very visible evidence of Singapore's great dependence on both Malaysia and Indonesia. As patterns of close ties began to develop between Malaysia and Indonesia after mid-1966, the ability of Prime Minister Lee to bargain between them had to be severely questioned.

As a result Singapore began late in 1966 to aim for improved relations within Asia. At one point Prime Minister Lee attempted to interest the government of India in a proposal for all-Asian regional cooperation. The reaction in

New Delhi, however, was negative, and reports suggested that Lee had been all but ignored.³⁹ At about the same time, however, the developments that led ultimately to SEAARC and ASEAN began to take shape, and the prospect of Singapore's involvement was raised.⁴⁰ Both Prime Minister Lee and his foreign minister initially adopted a coquettish posture. They stressed that although they were interested in the general concept of cooperation, their willingness to participate depended on whether Singapore would reap clear and economic benefits from regionalism.

The realities of Singapore's position, however, suggest that as long as Indonesia and Malaysia are agreed on matters, Singapore has very little latitude either to act independently or to press for a "Singapore position." Although her leaders tried as late as July 1967 to give the impression that "Singapore will associate herself with other countries in the region [only] in the planning and execution of a few carefully selected economic projects,"⁴¹ the establishment of ASEAN shows little or no Singapore imprint. If Singapore wanted to extract some price for her membership, the enthusiasm that Foreign Minister Rajaratnam showed for the SEAARC concept as early as May would have made it difficult for him to bargain effectively.⁴² Instead it is very likely that Singapore leaders are pleased with the establishment of ASEAN. For the same economic arguments that lead nations of 10 million and 30 million people to believe that wider cooperation is helpful must apply with even greater force to a tiny island state of only 2 million people.

In Singapore's case the incentives for regional cooperation are further improved, of course, by the fact that she is squeezed in between Malaysia and Indonesia. Leaders (as well as plain people) in those nations share a great dislike for Chinese-dominated Singapore, and regional cooperation with Thailand and the Philippines may help to dilute somewhat Singapore's heavy dependence on Malaysia and Indonesia. At most, however, Singapore can hope to influence the region's affairs in only marginal ways, and very likely that is all her leaders will want. They know that the 2 million urbanized citizens of Singapore are critically dependent on a "business as usual" environment in Southeast Asia, and they hope that ASEAN can contribute to that goal. Indeed Singapore probably has more at stake in ASEAN's success than any of the other participating nations; if that is recognized it may be possible to expect special kinds of support from Lee's government.

The Philippines

If Singapore's participation in ASEAN could almost be taken for granted, this had not been the case for the Philippines. As shown also in a related RAC study,⁴³ President Marcos has been less active than the administration of either President Garcia or Macapagal in stressing regional cooperation. Part of the reason for this has been Marcos' hope of avoiding too close an identification with the policy positions adopted by his predecessor, President Macapagal. MAPHILINDO in particular had overtones that President Marcos opposed when he was in the Philippine senate, and on several occasions he criticized the too close relation that Manila was then forming with Indonesia. But one aspect of MAPHILINDO bore the special imprint of Sukarno, and that was the sentiment that expressed disdain for foreign bases and "collective defense" agreements. SEATO no doubt was the target of these 1963 criticisms,

which read that "arrangements of collective defense should not be used to serve the particular interest of any of the big powers."

As noted earlier, these are the words that also appeared in Thanat Khoman's SEARCA proposal of December 1966, but they do not appear in the ASEAN Declaration as published in August 1967. The supposition must be that they were deleted at the insistence of the Philippine government.⁴⁴ There was probably considerable discussion at the Bangkok ASEAN meetings on precisely this point, for when ASEAN was announced, only the Philippine Foreign Secretary alluded to the "trying" diplomacy involved in its creation. Ramos announced that "The Declaration we have just signed was not easy to come by; it is the result of a long and tedious negotiation which truly taxed the good will, the imagination, the patience and the understanding of the five participating ministers."⁴⁵ None of the other foreign ministers made any public reference to the difficulty of the negotiations, nor did any of the others express reservations and qualifications about ASEAN. Ramos, however, was at pains to stipulate that "ASEAN is not intended to supplant, replace or eliminate any existing regional organization."

The likely explanation for this is that the Philippines was not yet prepared to see the end of ASA. The Tunku too was not anxious "to sacrifice ASA," but the history of Philippine-Malaysian relations during the past 4 years will make it difficult for the two to work together on that shared goal. The reason is that the Tunku feels that Manila did not support ASA effectively after Macapagal launched the abah claim and associated the Philippines with Indonesia. Admittedly that was several years ago, but as late as 1967 some Philippine officials made statements about Sabah that continue to irritate the Malaysian leader. In April, for example, the Philippine consul general wrote to the Straits Times that free elections were not possible in Sabah, and the reaction from the Malaysian Foreign Ministry was severe and immediate. Kuala Lumpur asked for "urgent clarification" from Manila and hinted that further public debate "may adversely affect Malaysia-Philippines relations."⁴⁶

These small details deserve mention here because they help illustrate one important fact: events set in motion in 1963-1964, at the time of the Konfrontasi, have had an immense effect on the relations among the five states now in ASEAN. The confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia was in many respects a catalyst for the international politics of Southeast Asia. Among other things it helped bring the states into far more intensive contact and communications than ever before. ASA had just begun to do that for three of them but not necessarily on matters of high political sensitivity. Konfrontasi, on the other hand, forced each of the area's top leaders to reflect—more than he had been required to do before—about his role in the region's affairs.⁴⁷ The tensions that accompanied Konfrontasi were considerable, and, in each of the three nations concerned, many doubted the wisdom of the steps their governments had taken. Some leaders like Macapagal ultimately backed away from their first policy directions, and it is very likely that Sukarno and Subandrio too were looking for a way out of the conflict a few months after it began. Indeed, throughout the entire affair each of the states seemed to be searching for a way to restore peaceful relations at a minimum, and if possible to forge some kind of cohesion after the dispute. In this respect the Konfrontasi was a severe learning experience, and it is likely that ASEAN—probably the first

genuinely important step in Asian regionalism—is a direct by-product of that experience.

But if ASEAN is a positive by-product of the Konfrontasi, some aspects of the Philippine foreign policy in that period appear to have produced negative results. One of these was the damage done to relations with Malaysia, for despite Manila's efforts to develop a close connection with Indonesia, it is very unlikely that a genuine accord with Djakarta was ever reached. Instead the Philippines was seen by Subandrio and Sukarno as merely instrumental to their own interests. Despite the Macapagal-Sukarno oratory of 1963-1964, Indonesia's leaders were not suddenly convinced that a new, more "Asian" Philippine nation had come into being. Consequently, when President Macapagal began to move away from Indonesia and resume contacts with Malaysia in 1964, this step irritated but did not surprise Indonesia's leaders. Former Philippine Ambassador Reyes, who had represented his country in Djakarta during much of this period (and apparently bore some of the brunt of Sukarno's irritation), made this clear in an interview. He said that Indonesia's earlier attitudes of suspicion and distrust toward the Philippines, which he had tried to soften, were resurrected by Macapagal's efforts to step back from the close ties with Sukarno.⁴³

On balance it would seem therefore that Philippine foreign policy sustained a net loss from its behavior during the Konfrontasi. Manila did not succeed in gaining a new friend in Djakarta, and it damaged some of the friendship that had been developing with Malaysia. That friendly attitude had been built only with difficulty in the first place because Malaysian leaders initially had viewed Filipino political behavior in essentially negative terms. Those negative attitudes (to some extent the result of Malaysia's British heritage) were ameliorated somewhat during the first ASA experience but were then reinforced during Konfrontasi. They have not been much improved since, and leaders in Kuala Lumpur still tend to view Filipino political behavior as untrustworthy and, in diplomacy particularly, as bumbling and amateurish. This is probably the view in Djakarta as well. The Philippine-Indonesia relation is probably still cool, especially to the extent that Marcos and Ramos sought to modify some of the language Malik wanted included in the ASEAN Declaration.

This suggests that the Philippines, if in fact its leaders want to establish their Asian "identity," must still work to overcome the view that they are mere puppets of the US. But the Philippines is in a state of transition; its leaders are anxious to be accepted as fully independent and at the same time not yet prepared to take stands too far removed from those of the US. This is not to say that Manila adopts a subservient attitude in its bilateral relations with the US. Indeed, one of the most popular methods of demonstrating one's independence in Philippine domestic politics is to adopt a somewhat anti-American stance.

Ironically, however, when Filipino leaders speak in Asian councils they seem still very much inclined to display a different posture, one more aligned with the US. Their public attachment to SEATO is one reflection of this tendency, and until Manila's leaders decide that they can safely cast their lot with their neighbors the Philippines will continue to represent something of a hindrance to Southeast Asian regionalism. The evidences of change, however, are increasingly apparent, even in circles not generally associated with the Philippine

"left." For example, in commenting on Indonesia's regional proposals, the Manila Times recently remarked:

Western, particularly American, presence in Asia is not going to be a permanent thing, and farsighted Asian leaders are looking forward to the day when Western presence is removed, in which case the Asians themselves should be prepared to fill the "vacuum" left by the withdrawal.⁴⁵

Thailand

This same view is expressed in Bangkok by Thanat Khoman, Thailand's Foreign Minister. Indeed, the difference between the foreign policies of Thailand and the Philippines is that Thai leaders have begun to act on principles that in Manila are expressed only by editorial writers. A good part of the reason for this difference is that Thai leaders, unique in Southeast Asia, reflect a deep and self-conscious foreign policy tradition. This is decidedly not the case in Malaysia, the Philippines, or even in Indonesia.⁵⁰ In Thailand today's foreign policy leaders feel a deep and genuine sense of pride in the skills represented in the last century by King Chulalongkorn, Prince Damrong, and Prince Devawongse—pride in the fact that under those leaders Thailand preserved her independence.

Those early Thai policies were essentially successful, and for that reason today's foreign policy makers in Bangkok feel responsibility toward a continuing and high tradition of foreign policy leadership. They regard themselves as the inheritors of a precious legacy: skilled diplomacy in the service of Thai independence. One of the most important substantive lessons that Thai foreign policy has handed down, moreover, comes directly from late nineteenth century experience: that Thailand should not trust too implicitly any great power, even the most friendly.

In Thailand's Foreign Ministry today this sense of continuity is reflected in many ways; one is the degree of professionalism that exists nowhere else in Southeast Asia and is surpassed in Asia only by the Gaimusho (the Japanese Foreign Ministry). Another reflection is in the high degree of sensitivity to any actions that appear to infringe on Thai sovereignty, either in substance or form. This is apparent not only in the behavior of Thanat Khoman but in the style of such younger men as Anand Panyarachun (now Ambassador at the UN), Sompong Sucharitkul (the Minister's principal secretary), and Pracha Gunakasem. It is from these and similar ranks that a new Thai Foreign Minister will at some future date be drawn. These men, from the Minister on down, are all "friends" of the US, and they recognize as Thanat Khoman does that Thailand's present security depends on the American alliance. But in their dealings with the US, whether on matters of the highest policy (where Thanat Khoman acts) or on seeming technicalities like a Status of Forces Agreement (where his assistants have some responsibility), Thai officials are constantly on guard against any implication that their nation is not a full and equal partner with the US.

Their diplomatic style, especially when dealing today with Americans, might as a result be characterized by some as arrogant, and perhaps it is. But it is a style that comes from a recognition that Thailand is small, that the

surrounding Asian environment is a dangerous one, and that of necessity rather than out of friendship Thailand must grudgingly accept the help of a great power. Consequently US dealings with Thailand are seldom easy, and bargaining particularly is hard—more like negotiations in a truce than between warm partners. And the reason for this, once again, is that Thailand is not pleased with the state of affairs that requires her to depend on an outsider. She will tolerate it, but like Thanat Khoman himself Thailand is uncomfortable with the position.⁵¹ It is seen as temporary dependence, and any suggestion that Thailand is or could be subservient to the US is immediately and bitterly resented. As the Foreign Minister has said:

I will be very frank. Especially where we felt we had cooperated, borne more than our share of the defense, exposed ourselves, been willing to take a risk well beyond our part in the defense treaty, we did not enjoy being treated, well, in a less understanding way. We had the right to talk back. We are not a client state.⁵²

It is precisely because Thailand bristles at the need for dependence on the US that Thanat Khoman has taken the lead in promoting Asian regionalism. He has maintained a very close and understanding posture with all the nations now represented in ASEAN, and his considerable diplomatic skills have been crucial in keeping alive the concept of regional cooperation. Part of the reason lies in the Minister's deep personal interest in the idea, but more than his skills as a negotiator have been involved. Instead it is clear that the Thai leader has a vision of what Southeast Asia should become after the immediate postcolonial era in which we are now living. His thesis is a simple one, and surprising only to those who do not recognize why he led his nation into such close relations with the US. For Thanat Khoman, despite Thailand's membership in SEATO and despite the presence of large US forces in Thailand in support of the Vietnam war, states simply that his goal is to have the Americans leave Southeast Asia: "It is our long-range hope to build an effective Pacific community—to forge one that will be a successful deterrent to aggression."⁵³

Of course this is not his goal for the immediate future, for he is under no illusions that the security of Southeast Asia can be taken for granted—at this point in time—without the massive presence of the US. That regard Thanat Khoman and other Thais are among the most hawkish of hawks with regard to Vietnam.⁵⁴ He has approved and endorsed the very large buildup of American military installations in his country,⁵⁵ and when other Thai leaders were still hesitant about openly conceding the role of those bases in connection with Vietnam bombing, he was prepared to make Thailand's role quite public. But at the same time Thai leaders stress that the American military role—indeed the role of any outsider—must be only temporary.

When the Thai Foreign Minister argues in this vein he is sure to gain the support of almost all leaders in the area. While ASEAN was in the making, for example, he said that its ultimate purpose was to establish a group that eventually could help to "balance" the weight of China in Asia. Such a group would of course have to include the most Southeast Asian states, and would no doubt require the assistance of outsiders as well. But his hope is that Asian states can develop sufficiently tight links that they can become free of the "dictation" of any of the great powers. Ultimately, it seems clear, he hopes for a degree

of cohesion that will allow Southeast Asia—as a region—to deal separately with the USSR, with China, and with the US.⁵⁵

Clearly these are ambitious hopes, but Thanat does not hide his conviction that the interests of his own nation, the US, and other Southeast Asian states will be served by eventual US withdrawal from Southeast Asia. It is in this context that Thanat Khoman's approach is quite consistent with "traditional" Thai foreign policy, if the objective of that policy is taken to be the continued independence of Thailand. The familiar policy steps that Thai leaders historically have taken in support of that goal have often been criticized, for it is sometimes held that Thai leaders have been unprincipled—that they have simply sided with the strongest state in Asia. There is some validity to this argument, and Thai foreign-policy behavior in the years just before and during World War II is often cited in support of the notion that Thailand cannot be "counted on." Thailand did of course associate itself with Japan, and many Thais (trained in Europe) were without question impressed with the rise of Germany under Hitler.

At the same time Thailand in the postwar era has made a strikingly intense commitment in its association with the US. Some Thai leaders have no doubt questioned the wisdom of this policy and would have preferred an approach that might have left more room for eventual rapprochement with China. But for the time being Thanat Khoman has rejected this view, in the conviction that only the US could provide Thailand and the region of Southeast Asia with security. He has accepted the proposition that China, especially China with the cutting edge of communism, is expansionist. By this he means that if China's aims are satisfied, there must come an end to genuine independence for Thailand and to hope for finally achieving independence in the rest of the region.⁵⁶ Thus as long as the states of Southeast Asia are unable to provide for their own security and as long as their low state of economic development makes them prey to subversion, he has not resisted the heavy dependence on the US characteristic of the past decade.

But beginning in the 1960's Thanat has sensed the change in Asia that President Johnson referred to in his Honolulu speech of October 1965: that the nations of Asia are beginning to emerge from their postcolonial fixation with ideology. Ever since the Tunku and President Garcia approached Thanat in 1959 with the proposal that eventually became ASA, he has been fostering the concept of regionalism. His reason has been unabashedly political. He has recognized that as long as the nations within the region were divided, and even in conflict with one another, they could never hope to achieve that stability that has two purposes: to encourage friendly outsiders to believe that it was possible to "leave" the region; and to deter unfriendly outsiders from attempting to exploit the region's weaknesses. As a result Thanat has been in the forefront of those supporting pragmatic regionalism, and the shape of ASA, as it developed between 1961 and 1964, shows the Thai imprint more than any other. Following his example and with his endorsement, many other articulate Thais have also come to support the concept, and some of the soundest planning for regional economic cooperation has come from Bangkok.

It was for this reason—to keep the concept of regional cooperation alive—that Thanat undertook the role of diplomatic broker in Southeast Asia. His role in mediating the *Konfrontasi* was critical, and during the Sabah disagreement between the Philippines and Malaysia, as was suggested earlier, he also

served as the communications link. At one point in that controversy the former Vice President of the Philippines referred to Thanat as "our ASA Ambassador."⁵⁷ Similarly, as the discussion of the development of SEAARC and ASEAN has shown, Thanat played the vital role of "introducing" Indonesia into the new efforts aimed at achieving regional cooperation. When the Tunku has had doubts about Indonesia, it is more than likely that Thanat has acted to allay those doubts.⁵⁸ When President Marcos has had doubts about the wording of ASEAN, Thanat has been able to point to his own membership in SEATO and the bases at Sattahip and other Thai locations as evidence that ASEAN does not compromise the continuing reliance on the US.

These considerations suggest that if regionalism is to take hold in Southeast Asia, Thailand's role will continue to be crucial, but today there is a difference. The difference is Indonesia. Indonesia's involvement in cooperative efforts will mean that those in Malaysia already attracted to close ties with Djakarta will be encouraged to intensify those ties. Malaysian leaders like the Tunku, whose tendency from 1958 to 1963 was almost to ignore Indonesia, will find that posture increasingly untenable. Increasingly they are likely to have to "choose" between their present close ties with Thailand and the shifts in foreign policy emphasis that their Indonesian relation will tend to require, if not demand. Already this is hinted in the ASEAN context by Foreign Minister Malik's desire to enlist Ceylon as the next member, on the assumption that Ceylon's participation will give ASEAN a suitably neutralist image.

It is in this sense that Indonesian-Thai relations may also be affected. Up to now, that is, Bangkok and Djakarta have had very warm relations, partly in consequence of the fact that the two have had so little to do with one another. Within the framework of Southeast Asian regionalism, however, Bangkok has exercised a clear leadership, and Indonesia's new interest and role may pose new competition. Yet Thanat so far has been able to accommodate himself to Indonesian desires; the wording of his SEAARC declaration was itself dictated by the goal of ensuring Djakarta's support. Thanat may even feel that he can "manage" Indonesia, for Thai leaders have been known to discount the role of Djakarta in the region's affairs.⁵⁹ Now, however, with Indonesian leaders showing a very strong interest in the region and with some (like GEN Panggabean) proposing an organization for regional defense cooperation, it will no longer be possible to dismiss Indonesia's influence. The sheer dynamism that Djakarta represents, along with the special attraction it holds both for Malaysia and the Philippines, cannot be ignored even now. To the extent that the new regime is able to come to grips with Indonesia's internal difficulties and achieve greater economic stability, Indonesian influence must increase in Southeast Asia.

As a result Thailand will face some competition for influence, but there is much working in Thailand's favor. First, it is not Thanat Khoman's aim to achieve Thai dominance in the region, even if that were a feasible goal. Second, there is sufficient ambivalence about Indonesia's own aims in Singapore, in the Philippines, and among some officials in Malaysia that other leaders will welcome a very active role for Thailand. But perhaps most important, Thailand has demonstrated an impressive capacity for achievement, by Southeast Asian standards. Her performance in economic development, especially with her 7 percent growth rate, testifies to considerable managerial skills in Thailand, and these are likely to be of major importance if regionalism is to become

meaningful. Indonesia especially is in need of managerial and technical assistance, and one of the most likely fields of cooperation in the new ASEAN format can be among the Thais and Indonesians. It is this prospect, more than any other, that gives ASEAN much of its promise—for Indonesia and Thailand together represent the major and until now separate forces of Southeast Asia: the conservative and pragmatic skills in which Bangkok abounds and the flamboyance and “Asian-ness” that Indonesia has long symbolized.

Cooperating, these forces can bring to Southeast Asia the stability that it has long lacked and on which eventual American withdrawal from the region depends.

OTHER REGIONAL EFFORTS

This chapter, although it has focused on Asian regionalism, has not dealt with all efforts in the field of Asian regional cooperation, e.g., the series of ministerial conferences recently endorsed by the US (including meetings on higher education and transport) and the cooperative efforts represented by the Mekong Project. In both cases the reason for the omission is the same: those efforts do not tend to reflect major political incentives in the region. Some are highly useful cooperative ventures, but unlike the efforts represented by ASA and ASEAN, they have not attracted the commitment and interest of the highest levels of the participating governments.

ASPAC

One regional effort in Asia that seemed initially to attract that level of interest has, however, not been discussed here: the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). There are three reasons for this omission. First, as this is written ASPAC is barely 1 year old, and its outlines are still too loose to allow for useful analysis. More important, however, ASPAC has not drawn the level of interest in Southeast Asia that ASA and ASEAN attracted,⁶⁰ and it is Southeast Asian regionalism that has been most active during the past half-dozen years. Third, a careful analysis of ASPAC records and the comments of leading Southeast Asian officials concerned with its operations suggest already that ASPAC probably will not make the contribution to pragmatic regionalism that the ASA-ASEAN model promises. ASPAC has been plagued with disagreement over its role from its first meeting in June 1966, largely at South Korean initiative. Its nine members are all in what must be called the pro-Western camp, and any hopes that ASPAC might succeed in attracting states like Indonesia, Cambodia, or Burma disappeared soon after its first meeting.⁶¹ In discussions with Southeast Asian foreign ministers in January and February 1967, this author was repeatedly told that the efforts of Taiwan and South Korea to give ASPAC a heavy political imprint had caused resentment even among the participants. Japan and Malaysia in particular have tended to resist developing a regional grouping that was aimed at stressing essentially cold-war issues. By the time of the second ASPAC meeting, held in Bangkok in July 1967, the discord had become public, and the future of the organization seemed in doubt.⁶² Agreements were reached to cooperate on a number of points, but no one of these points seemed to have major importance or attraction.

A large part of the reason for this initially negative performance lies in the size of ASPAC. Its membership includes not only several of the Southeast Asian states but Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. The differences among these states are of course very considerable; and unlike the sense of region that has just begun to develop in Southeast Asia, little perspective is shared by, say, Malaysia and South Korea. But another consideration that has tended to impede progress in the ASPAC format is precisely the fact that while it was being formed, SEAARC was already under discussion. By the time of ASPAC's second meeting, moreover, ASEAN was about to be announced. It is very likely that the Southeast Asian participants of ASPAC feel that between the two approaches, the one that emphasizes Southeast Asia has far more chance of meeting their needs.

Finally it of course remains the great hope of Foreign Minister Malik as well as Thanat that ultimately Burma and Cambodia will join ASEAN. Leaders in both countries, when approached by Malik and his representatives in May 1967, made it clear that they would not publicly condemn the new grouping.⁶³ Thanat, moreover, has emphasized that he would not oppose Cambodian membership.²⁷ Both the Thai and Indonesian leaders remain hopeful that Rangoon and Phnom Penh will be able to join ASEAN, even if not immediately. This expectation cannot in any sense be applied to ASPAC. It is too firmly regarded as a cold-war product with anti-Chinese overtones that are too plain for leaders who hope for continued peaceful relations with Peking.

CONCLUSIONS

It has to be said that the momentum for regional cooperation in Asia at the present time is considerable and continuing, primarily with reference to Southeast Asia. Japan for a variety of reasons is regarded in that region as a necessary, even if informal, participant in whatever progress is made towards Southeast Asian collaboration and cohesion. But even in the ASEAN (i.e., Southeast Asian) framework, tangible results will not be easy to come by, and few leaders believe that much or indeed anything can be gained by broadening the concept to include Northeast Asian states like the non-Communist governments in Korea and Taiwan. It is simply felt that the ASPAC format is too broad, both geographically and politically, to hold significant promise for success.

In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, it does seem reasonable to conclude that—for the first time since World War II—there is legitimate promise for regional cooperation. One of the important explanations is found in the conviction among most Southeast Asian leaders that their problems are larger than any one of them can handle acting alone. But that reason would not by itself make ASEAN an especially promising development. The largest single factor that does give special importance to ASEAN is the fact of Indonesian participation. Indonesia has become for the first time a party to Southeast Asian regionalism, and the significance of that change cannot be minimized.

But even with all the Southeast Asian states involved, the concept of regional cooperation would still not be of major significance unless there were great-power support for the purposes of Asian regionalism. Today there is

that support, evidenced in both Japan and the US. To the extent that Japanese and American support is accompanied by technical and financial assistance for the ASEAN concept, the new body can develop into an organization of first-class significance. It represents in Southeast Asia the first step toward the building of Asian multipolarity. Its strength derives from the fact that multipolarity is in the national interest of all Asian and Pacific powers, the US and China included.

For the US the achievement of multipolarity is of course synonymous with the achievement of the overriding US interest in East Asia: the prevention of one-nation dominance in that region. For China too multipolarity can come to be regarded as acceptable, for it will mean the eventual withdrawal of the US from "provocative" positions immediately adjacent to China's borders. In a multipolar Asia China will not need to fear—because the US will not require—such proximate "containment" by the US or its associates.

By the same token, however, China will need to resist the temptation to extend her authority to those states whose independence can be regarded as irreducibly critical to the continued existence of a Southeast Asian region. The ASEAN states, with US assistance, can help China resist that temptation by ensuring that those states improve their ability to resist subversion and by improving their economic and political viability. They will be less susceptible to China's efforts as a result. Consequently, to the extent that regional cooperation contributes to those essentially protective goals it contributes to the national interest of the US as well.

Chapter 6

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US

The establishment of ASEAN in August 1967, although its immediate consequences should under no circumstances be exaggerated, is nevertheless a postwar development of the first magnitude. It reflects a movement towards Southeast Asian regional cooperation that has been gathering momentum since 1959-1960; if it continues to develop it will help create conditions in East Asia decidedly more favorable than those in which the US has operated since the end of World War II.

ASIAN TRENDS AND US OBJECTIVES

Until China came to be recognized by East Asian leaders as a likely great-power threat, the environment for regionalism could not be considered ripe. Similarly, until Indonesia participated in this development, regional cooperation in Southeast Asia could not take on important political significance. With the creation of ASEAN, that has begun. Indonesian membership in ASEAN means not only that Southeast Asia's largest state (with a population of 105 million) has altered its foreign-policy direction; it means too that a genuine basis for planning long-term Asian defense responsibility is being formed. Indonesia and Thailand (and to an increasing degree Malaysia and the Philippines) see security, especially against low-level threats, as a legitimate future purpose of Southeast Asian regional cooperation.

Indonesian and Thai leaders especially believe that planning must begin now for the day when the US will no longer bear the sole responsibility for Southeast Asia's security and defense. Foreign Minister Thanat of Thailand has expressed this in political terms; GEN Mokoginta and Panggabean of Indonesia have expressed it in its military context. In either case the objective of these leaders is to have the US "leave" Southeast Asia—but on terms quite consistent with the long-term interests and objectives of the US. For these leaders recognize, indeed emphasize, the need for very-long-term reliance on the US for ultimate security, i.e., in the event of general war. At the same time they understand that the more likely ranges of threat are at the level of subconventional war and subversion. Regional cooperation, they believe, can contribute to reducing their vulnerabilities to that level of threat, first by improving their developmental prospects, and second by improving

their defense capabilities through joint action. It is in this perspective that the interests and objectives of leading Southeast Asian states in furthering the concept of regionalism are highly consistent with US objectives.

Southeast Asian regional cooperation is of course not now an accomplished fact. The processes towards a significant degree of cohesion have only begun, and the intraregional rivalries that characterized many relations in the 1950's and early 1960's have not all disappeared. The Indonesian-Malaysian conflict, however, is most unlikely to arise again—not because Indonesia's essential aims have altered, but because a new generation of Malaysian leaders will avoid steps that alienate Djakarta. Despite a potential for irritants, the Philippine-Malaysian disagreement over North Borneo will probably not be revived by Manila; it failed to gain wide official and public support from 1962 to 1965, and present and future Philippine leaders are most likely to accept Sabah's inclusion in Malaysia as an accomplished fact. Only the Thai-Cambodian difficulty is likely to remain for some time; however, that problem will not impede initial progress toward a greater degree of Southeast Asian cohesion.

Instead the main variables that will affect the pace of cooperation will be (a) the extent to which Indonesia is able to participate constructively; (b) the ability of Thailand and Indonesia to share leadership in shaping regional cooperative developments; (c) the speed with which the Philippines accepts its role as a Southeast Asian state; (d) the perception of China that these states hold; and (e) the level and style of encouragement that is made available by such outsiders as Japan, Australia, and the US.

Only a few of these variables can be readily affected by actions of the US. It is clear, however, that the condition of a China marked by so many appearances of bellicosity as well as by internal chaos may help provide added time for the concept of Southeast Asian regionalism to take root. It is also clear that the indigenous Southeast Asian variables that have been identified need to be better understood, so that the US will be better able to gauge the prospects for regionalism as well as to consider actions that can affect those variables.

In US dealings with Japan and with the Philippines, for example, will it be within the capacity and interest of the US to take actions that encourage those states to participate more intimately in the affairs of the Southeast Asian region? Similarly in dealing with Thailand and Indonesia will it be feasible for the US to help facilitate the present good relations between those two critical states and at the same time to support their respective roles in the region? Only by careful examination of the foreign-policy perspectives of all these states will answers be found; studies should be undertaken that will separately examine each of these factors.

Finally it is clear that the creation of ASEAN poses the US with a dilemma. On the one hand this new interest in regionalism represents a vindication of US "holding" policies in Southeast Asia and a first step towards building multipolarity in East Asia as a whole. This is the result, as already pointed out, of two important developments: local Asian anxieties concerning China and local interest and support for the concept of regional cooperation. These factors will incline the US to welcome ASEAN.

At the same time many US officials will recommend against steps that appear to stamp ASEAN "Made in USA," for they will fear that clear US encouragement will represent a kiss of death for the new organization. Post-war US experience with Asian efforts at regional cooperation indicates that their fear will to some extent be justified. That experience has been disappointing, but the reason for the disappointment is not that the goal of Asian regionalism was incorrect: it was only premature. When regionalism was proposed by Asian leaders themselves (in 1948-1949) and promoted by the US and Britain later (in 1954-1955), the environment for cooperation was not ripe.

That environment is not perfect even now. It would be far better were Indonesia economically less weak, the Philippines politically less ambivalent, and Japan psychologically ready to again take the plunge into Asian affairs. What is appropriate or ripe in the 1967-1968 Asian environment, however, is the change in the political climate: most Southeast Asian leaders now share a very considerable political conviction that in regional cooperation they can both improve their states' economic performance and, ultimately, become their own men in Asian affairs. They wish vehemently to rid their region of the West, and they see regionalism as the way to achieve that goal.

US planners must appreciate the force of this conviction, for it means that Southeast Asian regionalism is harder than before. It is now indigenous, and its goals are directly in support of US interests and objectives in East Asia. In addition the fear that ASEAN will be labeled "Made in USA" is less relevant than before, because leaders like Malik and Thanat know quite well that this is not true. As a result the 1967 charges of Moscow (as early as April) and Peking (in July) that ASEAN is a creation of the US will have less weight than in the environment of the early 1960's.

These considerations mean that the US can and should assist the new group. The US can begin soon to move away from the low posture it has correctly adopted up to now towards Asian regionalism. This does not mean that the US should immediately begin to assist ASEAN financially. The planning for the directions in which ASEAN will go will require at least 1 year, and that planning must be the responsibility of the five states themselves. It does, however, mean that US officials should begin now to consider the levels and types of assistance that the US—along with like-minded states like Japan and Australia—can bring to bear in support of those ASEAN plans on which the indigenous states themselves concur.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. At this point in time the US approach to Africa is much like the Open Door initially applied to China in 1900. The difference, however, is that Africa is already divided, whereas China was never quite carved up by the European states. If Africa were less divided, and if simultaneously one great external state did seem capable and anxious to achieve dominance over much or all of Africa, the US approach might have to alter.
2. Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars 1932-1942, Columbia University Press, New York, 1966, pp 62-83.
3. Charles Wolf Jr., "United States Interests in Asia," Monograph F-3311, RAND Corporation, Jan 66, p 1.
4. Hans Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1952.

CHAPTER 2

1. On the general relation between regionalism and stability, any number of textbooks might be cited, and the most detailed discussion is in Ronald Yalem, Regionalism and World Order, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1965. For a recent and persuasive application to Asia, see Roger D. Masters, The Nation Is Burdened, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York, 1967, pp 244-45. The entire chapter "Asia and the Rising Power of China" is recommended.
2. John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1948, p 317.
3. Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East, reprinted in William A. Williams, The Shaping of American Diplomacy, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, 1960, p 474.
4. Samuel F. Bemis, A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., New York, 1959, p 348.

George F. Kennan has given wide publicity to a contrasting view: that Britain by 1898-99 "was beginning to move quietly away from the Open Door doctrine." American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1951, p 27. However, Kennan provides little support for this opinion, which is not concurred in by specialists on the diplomatic history of the US in the Far East. For example, P. H. Clyde writes that the American policy developed "in the late summer of 1899. . . . was a direct product of British initiative." The Far East, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 2d ed, p 295. This is also the conclusion of Bemis and Fairbank.

5. These words are the core of the Open Door doctrine. In later statements by American leaders, the words "administrative entity" were recast to read "territorial and administrative integrity." For the text of the Hay note, see Dorothy B. Goebel (ed), American Foreign Policy: A Documentary Survey, 1776-1960, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., New York, 1961, p 188.

6. Fairbank,² p 321. Goebel concurs in this view, and writes that Hay's note represents a "striking innovation in American policy, a departure from the traditional isolationism. . . . Formerly, three of the great powers signified their agreement with the United States' stand; but their concurrence was motivated by national rivalries and the struggle for balance of power in Asia." (Ref 5, p 186; emphasis added)
7. Nicholas J. Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1942, p 141.
8. The "Demands," as a famous State Department publication has put it, "would have made China a virtual protectorate of Japan." Dept of State, United States Relations with China, Publication 3573, Washington, D. C., 1949, p 7.
9. From Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, reprinted in Goebel,⁵ p 195. Note that Bryan referred specifically to the Open Door, and note too that he paraphrased the Hay note of 1900, with its reference to the US desire to "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity. . . ." Bryan altered this to read China's "political or territorial integrity."
10. William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, 1945-55, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1956, p 18.
11. A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1938, p 298.
12. Griswold wrote in 1938 that by 1920 it was clear that "the balance of power that had existed in the Far East since the nineteenth century had collapsed. Political circumstances. . . had left the United States to confront Japan—alone." (Ref 11, p 268) The Washington Conference a year later has to be seen in this light, as "the apotheosis of the traditional Far Eastern policy of the United States. . . the treaties constituted the most dynamic and the most comprehensive attempt on the part of the United States to uphold the territorial integrity of China and all that it believed to depend on it; to make the open door in China an enduring principle. . . and to confine within barriers manufactured in Washington the hungry expansionism of Japan." [Ref 11, p 331; emphasis added]
13. Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., New York, 1950, 3d ed, p 803.
14. W. W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1935, p 206.
15. In his discussions of Japan's expansion and declarations of 1931-1934, Bemis writes that Japan had entered on a clear policy of hegemony, and that "such an empire, erected on the ruins of ancient China, accompanied by a German empire built on the ruins of a conquered Europe, presaged an unbalance of power in the Old World which ought to be the nightmare of every anxious American. . . . It brought back the danger that had been removed for a generation by American intervention in the First World War. . . ." [Ref 13, p 821; emphasis added]
16. The New York Times, 21 Apr 34.
17. William R. Castle, "Japan's Monroe Doctrine," New York Herald Tribune, 6 May 34.
18. State Department announcement of 30 April 1934, quoted in Willoughby,¹⁴ p 638.
19. This and other press reactions are in Willoughby,¹⁴ pp 632-33.
20. See statement by Ambassador Grew to Japanese Foreign Minister Arita, 30 Dec 38, in U. S. Relations with China,⁶ Annexes, pp 459-63.
21. The US anxiety about China's aims has of course centered on China itself, but in the period immediately after Mao took power this anxiety was reinforced by fears that China and the USSR were joined in a tight bloc. It is increasingly clear, however, that the "Sino-Soviet bloc," which so worried Americans from 1949 to 1959, represented only a temporary convenience for Mao. From the beginning of his political career in the 1920's, as Stuart Schramm has shown, Mao has aligned himself with the USSR only when it suited China's purposes as perceived by Mao. Indeed the wonder to students of the Soviet Union and of China is not that there has been a split between the two nations, but that given their many national and ideological divergencies they succeeded in presenting a united front as long as they did. See Fairbank's² comments on Mao and on Schramm's interpretations of China's policies in the book review section, The Washington Post, 17 Jul 67.

CHAPTER 3

1. Dept of State, press releases, 15 Jan 38, pp 100-05, in T. A. Bisson, American Policy in the Far East, 1931-1941, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1941, p 151.
2. Samuel F. Bemis, A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., New York, 1959, p 291.
3. Julius Pratt has shown that "big business" was opposed to the 1898 war itself, to expansion of US territorial control generally, and to the creation of a large navy. Nevertheless Dewey's remarkable victory at Manila fired the imagination of many Americans, businessmen included. Where before they had been opposed to expansion, now it took on a new glamour, and the prospect of markets in China—which could hardly be demonstrated—suddenly seemed real. See Julius W. Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1955, p 385. Even Senator Beveridge, the most flamboyant spokesman for the expansionists, was able to point to no more than 9 percent of China's trade as involved with the US, and he carefully omitted to say how small a proportion of American foreign trade was with China. See the speech of January 9, 1900, in Ralph A. Goldwin (ed), Readings in American Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 1959, pp 75-93.
4. William P. Bundy, "American Policy in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia," address, 23 Jan 65, in Dept of State Bull., 8 Feb 65, pp 168-75.
5. See Bemis,² p 293:

The general expectation was that these spheres would soon become protectorates supported from the naval bases, that their extension and transformation into actual dominion would be only a question of time. . . . Let it be said, too, that each of the European powers, notably Great Britain, was more or less impelled to establish its sphere for fear that a rival would dominate China exclusively. [Emphasis added]
6. William D. Johnstone, The United States and Japan's New Order, Oxford University Press, Inc., New York, 1941, p 345. See his discussion on this point on pp 345-56.
7. Nicholas Spykman, America's Strategy in World Politics, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., New York, 1942. In his conclusions Spykman wrote that "a balance of power in the transatlantic zones is an absolute prerequisite for the . . . preservation of the power position of the United States." (p 457)
8. Walter Lippmann, "The Mystery of Our China Policy," in U. S. War Aims, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, Mass., 1944, reproduced in Goldwin.³
9. This appears in the first paragraph of "United States Relations with China," Dept of State Publication 3573, Washington, D. C., 1949, p 1.
10. In his Letter of Transmittal accompanying the White Paper, Secretary Acheson said—as if everyone had known it all along:

The record shows that the United States has consistently maintained and still maintains those fundamental principles of our foreign policy toward China which include the doctrine of the Open Door, respect for the administrative and territorial integrity of China, and opposition to any foreign domination of China. [Ref 9, p iv; emphasis added]

CHAPTER 4

1. The Pacific War Council, with the US President as Chairman, included Britain, Holland, China, Canada, and Australia and New Zealand. It was primarily the result of the urgings of Australia and New Zealand that they be better apprised of both wartime military decisions taken by the US against Japan and decisions that would affect the ultimate Pacific peace. The Council, characteristic of every other multilateral body set up in Asia and the Pacific since, did not amount to much. One delegate commented, even during the war, "Usually all we did was to listen to Mr. Roosevelt discuss what had been going on in the Pacific, and we generally already

- knew that through earlier talks with the military staffs." See The Dominion, Wellington, N. Z., 19 Dec 44, cited by Bernard K. Gordon, New Zealand Becomes a Pacific Power (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960, p 172. For other references to early attempts at Pacific regional cooperation see Daniel S. Cheever, Organizing for Peace, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1955, pp 810-11.
2. Since late 1964 contributions to the US effort in Vietnam have come in sizable proportions from the Republic of Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand, and less publicized help has come from a few others as well.
 3. President Johnson initiated this shift in American policy when he announced a \$1 billion program to encourage regional development in Southeast Asia in his Johns Hopkins speech in April 1965. Since then both the President and Walt Rostow, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, have on several occasions pointed to the strong US encouragement for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. The foremost example of presidential encouragement came in the President's speech in Hawaii in October 1966. In addition the administration has included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967 a specific provision authorizing expenditures in support of this goal.
 4. Among these are a series of Southeast Asian Ministerial Conferences, e.g., on higher education and on transportation. The US has given these its very strong encouragement through a Regional Development Office in the Bangkok Embassy.
 5. For a fuller discussion of the stability characteristics of a "tight" bipolar system, as compared with one that is "looser," see Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1956.
 6. From the President's address at the East-West Center, Honolulu, 7 October 1966. For full text see Dept of State Bull., 28 Nov 66, pp 812-16. For comments on the speech see The New York Times, 18 Oct 66, and the Christian Science Monitor, 19 Oct 66. The Monitor correspondent described the speech as one "of intent and changing attitudes. . . expected to take its place among the more earnest and meaningful policy documents of the time." Saville R. Davis, Christian Science Monitor, 19 Oct 66.
 7. The President is of course under no illusions about the pace of this development in Asia; his advisers know it will be slow. Until the security burden in particular can be handled effectively by indigenous Asian states, the US does not mean to abdicate its responsibility: "We recognize that our strength, our size, and wealth may impose a special obligation upon us in the transition to the new Asia." But he acknowledges too that while "the process of cooperation will be slow. . . the important thing is that all these things are happening. . . with Asian leadership and at Asian initiatives."
 8. From the President's address at Lancaster, Ohio, September 1966, quoted by Walt Rostow, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in an address at Middlebury College, 12 Jun 67.
 9. Rostow has also said:
As a historian. . . I know of few more remarkable developments than the new atmosphere of hope and determination to cooperate now sweeping Asia. . . . There has been slow movement forward in this direction for some time, but the present phase of intense cooperative activity is closely linked on two historic actions: the decision taken by President Johnson early in 1965 to do whatever was necessary to defeat aggression in Vietnam and second, the articulation of his vision for Asia in the Baltimore speech of 7 April 1965. [Dept of State Bull., 19 Dec 66, p 911; emphasis added]
 10. From transcript of "Meet the Press" interview with Walt W. Rostow, 9 Jul 67 (mimeo).
 11. In a Tokyo speech before the Keizai Doyukai [Committee for Economic Development] on 22 May 1967, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki said that there are "four aspects" to Japan's "Asia-Pacific policy." The second is "regional cooperation" in Southeast Asia; the third is "promoting cooperation among the advanced nations of the Pacific area," and the fourth, he said, is Japan's role in the familiar North-South developmental issue. Miki hopes to combine all these in a way that will allow Japan's economic and technological skills to be used in the most efficient way in Southeast

Asia, and the greatest efficiency not only implies some degree of cooperation in Southeast Asia but also represents "the rising trend among the participating nations for the realization of regional cooperation in Asia." From Foreign Minister Miki's "Concept of an Asia-Pacific Sphere" in Japan Report, 13 (12): (30 Jun 67). Japan Information Service, Consulate General of Japan, New York, pp 3-4.

12. The still-unformed concept being increasingly mentioned by Japanese leaders, most commonly by Foreign Minister Miki, has been referred to as an "Asian and Pacific Sphere."
13. For analyses of China's great-power ambitions see A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia, Random House, Inc., New York, 1960, pp 65-66; Richard G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1962, p 87; and Vidya Prakash Dutt, China and the World, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1966, p 29.
14. On the removal of Western influence see Boyd,¹³ p 87, and O. Edmund Clubb, "China's Position in Asia," J. of International Affairs, XVII (2): 115 (1963).
15. China's perspectives on her role in Asia are discussed in Barnett,¹³ pp 65-66, and H. Arthur Steiner, "Communist China in the World Community," International Conciliation, (533): 401 (May 1961).
16. Some of the reasons for China's immediate interest in Southeast Asia are dealt with in Boyd,¹³ p 87, and Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1966, p 394.
17. The lesser risks involved in this area as compared with others are discussed in Boyd,¹³ p 53, and Hinton,¹⁶ p 121.
18. David Mozingo, "Containment in Asia Reconsidered," World Politics, Apr 67, pp 361-77.
19. The New York Times Book Review, 16 Jul 67, p 23.
20. The "Malayan National Liberation League," an organization based in Peking, said through a China news release recently:
All genuine Malayan patriots must therefore step up their struggle against modern revisionism. . . at the same time as stepping up their struggle against US-backed British imperialism and the Malayan [Rahman-Lee Kuan Yew] puppets, in order to crush "Malaysia" and the new-type colony of Singapore and achieve the genuine independence of a unified Malaya.
[New China News Agency, 14 May 67].
21. The subject of Chinese involvement in the attempted Indonesian coup of 30 September 1965 is a matter of some debate. A number of scholars point to reports of secret arms shipments from China to Indonesia in the weeks just before the coup. See, for example, Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia," The China Quarterly, Jan-Mar 66, p 168, and J. V. Van der Kroef, "GESTAPU in Indonesia," ORBIS, summer 1966, p 467, where he cites reports in the Sabah Times, 14 Sep 65. The belief, substantiated by these reports, is that China supplied arms disguised as building supplies in a conspiracy approved by Subandrio, allowing arms to enter Indonesia without customs inspection. Nevertheless some specialists find it difficult to believe that China engaged in this activity.

The Indonesian government and many Indonesians are persuaded that China was involved, and this is the view also accepted by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand. China has of course not "admitted" complicity, but a new twist came recently when the remnants of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) based in Peking released their "self-criticism" designed to explain the "failure" of the coup attempt. The gist of the self-criticism (called precisely that by the Peking group) is that the coup failed—and was destined to fail—because the PKI misapplied the revolutionary principles of Mao and Lenin. The statement does not deny that the purpose of the PKI was to bring about a Communist regime in Indonesia. It says only that the PKI "did not prepare" Indonesia for "the possibility of a nonpeaceful road" to communism: "The most striking proof of [this error] was the grave tragedy which happened after the outbreak and the failure of the 30 September movement." New China News Agency, 8 Jul 67 (emphasis added). This can be interpreted as a mea culpa.

22. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Burma (also based in Peking) called in July 1967 for "all the Burmese people to rise up to strive for the complete overthrow of the Ne Win military government and the establishment of a people's democratic and united front government. . . . Down with the reactionary Ne Win military government!" New China News Agency, 1 Jul 67. It is difficult to reconcile this statement with the Mozingo thesis that China opposes only those who are closely tied to the US.
23. Coral Bell, "Towards a Stable Asia," The World Today, Apr 66, and reprinted in Survival, Jun 66, p 190.
24. From press conference remarks of Prince Sihanouk in Phnom Penh, 18 September 1967, reported by Radio Cambodia, 18 Sep 67, and reprinted in the Christian Science Monitor, 17 Oct 67.
25. From the Prince's remarks to correspondents on 5 October 1967.
26. Sihanouk letter to The New York Times, 4 Jun 65. For an analysis of consistency in Cambodian foreign policy see Bernard K. Gordon, "Cambodia: Where Foreign Policy Counts," Asian Survey, Sep 65, pp 433-48.
27. In Phnom Penh, ethnic Cambodians (Khmers) are in a minority: Chinese and Vietnamese dominate the life of that city. In the economic life of Burma a similar pattern existed for decades, but on a lower scale and with different players. In that case colonial policy resulted in the dominance in Burmese life of alien Indians as well as Chinese. Burma has for some years been embarked on a policy of evicting Indian businessmen, bankers, and shopkeepers, but the anti-Chinese activities in Rangoon in mid-1967 would indicate that this policy had not yet caught up with the local Chinese population.
28. This statement is based in part on a series of interviews with senior officials, especially foreign ministers, in Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia, most recently in February 1967.
29. See A. D. Goseco, "Underdeveloped Countries: A Multilateral Trading Scheme," The Eastern Economist, 1 Sep 61; Donald B. Keesing, "A Proposal for a Small Common Market," Malayan Economic Review, 1965; "Regional Trade Cooperation: An Exploratory Study with Special Reference to Asia and the Far East," Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, XII (1): (Jun 61); "Report of the Consultative Group of Experts on Regional Economic Cooperation in Asia," Bangkok, ECAFE, 17 Dec 61, (mimeo); D. T. Lakdawala, "Trade Cooperation Within the ECAFE Region," Pakistan Development Review, summer 1962, pp 543-57; and "Approaches to Regional Harmonization of National Development Plans in Asia and the Far East," E/EN.11/CAEP.2/L.5, 25 Sep 64, available from ECAFE offices in Bangkok.
30. For both groups this distaste stems from similar origins: from the nonalignment ideology generated in the 1950's. That ideology held that military "pacts" sponsored by the US reflected a "cold-war mentality," and although Asian leaders themselves increasingly accept the American view that China does represent a threat, the old slogans die hard.
31. Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, in conversations during the past several years in Bangkok. Also see: United Nations, "The Asian Development Bank and Trade Liberalization," Regional Economic Cooperation Series No. 2, UN Publication No. 65. II.F.15, 1965; and Hiroshi Kitamura and Ajit Bhagat, "Regional Harmonization of National Development Plans and Trade Co-Operation: Approaches to Economic Integration in the Developing ECAFE Region," available from University of Wisconsin Dept of Economics, 1967.
32. This is also the view expressed by Kyoshi Kojima, Lim Tay Boh, Noboru Yamamoto, and Saburo Okita, as stated in interviews in Tokyo, Singapore, and Bangkok between 1962 and 1967. For more detailed discussion of this subject see Chap. V in Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966, pp 141-61.
33. See, for example, the speech and article by Paul Sithi-Amnuai, "A Regional Bank as a First Step Towards an Asian Common Market," Bangkok Bank Monthly Review, March 1963, p 76. Sithi-Amnuai is now a vice president of the bank, based in New York. In several extended conversations with this writer over the past few years he has reaffirmed his conviction that regional cooperation will be a permanent

- feature of the Southeast Asian scene. His ideas for an "Asian Bank" have already been vindicated, and it is likely that he will continue to be very influential.
34. Based on a conversation with a former senior Treasury official now associated with the Asian Development Bank. A member of the Policy Planning Council Staff in the State Department has also commented that "as late as March, 1965 we were unwilling to participate in the Asian Development Bank. . . ." (See Thelma E. Vettel, "The Future of Economic Cooperation in Asia, mimeo, Dept of State, Jun 66.)
 35. Quoted in The Washington Post, 30 Oct 66, citing Thanat Khoman's remarks to correspondents in Bangkok on 29 October.
 36. Among those interviewed in January-February 1967, in connection with this study, were the following:
 Philippines: Narciso Ramos, Foreign Secretary; Pablo Pena, Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Manuel Collantes; and Rafael Salas, Executive Secretary, Office of the President.
 Malaysia: Tan Sri Ghazalie, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs; Jack De Silva (now Chargé in Saigon).
 Indonesia: Foreign Minister Adam Malik; Anwar Seni, Under Secretary for Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry.
 Singapore: Foreign Minister Rajaratnam.
 Thailand: Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman; Sompong Sucharitkul, and several of Thanat Khoman's immediate subordinates.
- In almost all cases these meetings were the most recent of a series begun several years earlier. In earlier visits these interviews included Dr. Subandrio in Indonesia, Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak in Malaysia, and others.
37. Denis Warner, "First Steps Toward an Asian Common Market," The Reporter, 18 May 67, pp 24-30.
 38. From remarks of Dr. Goh Keng Swee, quoted in Warner,³⁷ p 24.
 39. India, responding to American initiative, invited a number of countries to meet in Simla, India in May 1955. The purpose was to discuss an American proposal for a "President's Fund for Asian Economic Development." It was found that for a variety of reasons most of the states invited were not interested in the forms of economic cooperation envisaged. See David Wightman, Toward Economic Cooperation in Asia, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1963, pp 295-96.

CHAPTER 5

1. Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia. Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1966, Chaps. 5 and 6.
2. Details can be found in "Report of the Third Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of ASA, August 3-5, 1966"; the "Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on External Assistance," Manila, 20 to 22 Sep 66, mimeo; and the draft "Rules and Procedures. . . ASA Fund," 1966. The author has consulted these and other ASA documents at several ASA national secretariat offices.
3. ASA Permanent Subcommittee on Liberalization of Trade, Joint Communique, 3 Jun 67.
4. See the report in the Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 Jul 67, p 138. This was one of the first public references to SEAARC by that name.
5. Sukarno's letter to the Tunku, 39 December 1959. The Tunku wrote on 28 October 1959 to invite Sukarno to participate in forming ASA. For the text of his letter see Gordon,¹ pp 170-71.
6. From "Proposed Outlines of a Greater Malayar Confederation," p 94. This and other excerpts are found in Gordon,¹ pp 22-23.
7. Interview with Subandrio 4 July 1963.
8. This is not to deny that objectively it has always seemed reasonable to expect Indonesia to be cautious at best about China and very possibly to find its foreign-policy aims inconsistent with Peking's. Sukarno, for example, is reported to have said to some of his ambassadors in preconfederation days that "the future confrontation in Asia will be against the Chinese. . . only an alliance of the Malay people."

[including the Filipinos], the Indian subcontinent, Thailand and Japan would be able to meet the challenge." The Economist, 10 Jun 67, pp 11-12. It is very likely that Sukarno did say words roughly to that effect at one point, and it is precisely because those sentiments seem so correct that Sukarno's later willingness to force a near-alliance with Peking distressed so many Indonesians as well as foreign observers.

9. See the author's proposal in Dimensions of Conflict, (Ref 1, pp 191-93) as part of a general suggestion for "A new effort at regional cooperation [that] must meld two quite different perspectives: a hard-headed knowledge of the needs and requirements of economic and political development. . . and a strident. . . Asian nationalism A new effort. . . will have to combine the energies of both. Clearly, it would contain more of the trappings of the new Asian nationalism than was displayed by ASA. . . . [and] would have to be far more meaningful and concrete than the very vague Maphilindo."
10. The term SEAARC was publicly used in a report from Djakarta in the Christian Science Monitor, 4 Aug 67. A few days later ASEAN was formed.
11. Malik, it should be pointed out, is a relative of the senior Malaysian official responsible for foreign affairs, Tan Sri Ghazalie Bin Schafie. In a conversation with this writer Ghazalie described Malik as his "cousin," but it is not certain how close the family tie is. The two are, however, on a very friendly basis; Ghazalie feels quite at home in Malik's house.
12. For reports on these negotiations and discussions see articles in The Washington Post, 19 and 31 May 66, as well as The New York Times, 7 Jun 66.
13. The New York Times, 3 Jun 66.
14. The New York Times, 24 Aug and 30 Aug 66.
15. Interview with the author, New York, October 1966.
16. Malik's conversation with this author at the Indonesian Embassy, Washington, October 1966.
17. In March 1966, with Sukarno still in power, he tried to persuade the Filipino government not to reestablish its diplomatic relations with Malaysia (The Washington Post, 8 Mar 66). By May, when Sukarno's power was in its period of rapid decline, he expressed his discontent with the talks then taking place with Malaysian leaders in Bangkok. It was apparently at this time that the Indonesian President was requested to make no more speeches on foreign-policy subjects. The Washington Post, 31 May 66.

In addition, and as late as August 1966, other leading Indonesians complained about the end of the confrontation, and they were not always leaders closely aligned with President Sukarno. For example, Mohamed Dahlan, Chairman of the central committee of the Moslem Scholars, (a party that claims about 8 million members) demanded a return to the agreement signed in Manila in 1963. This called for elections in Sabah and Sarawak, and it implied that Indonesia should not establish peaceful relations with Malaysia until Sukarno's demands of 3 years before had been satisfied.

18. The New York Times, 30 Aug 66.
19. The New York Times, 24 Aug 66.
20. This also appears as Paragraph 4 in the Joint Communique of the Foreign Ministers Conference, Manila, 7 to 11 Jun 63, and is published in Malaya/Philippine Relations, Govt of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1963, App VII, p 26. See also Gordon,¹ p 102.
21. From the draft, "Joint Declaration, Southeast Asian Declaration for Regional Cooperation," probably mid-December 1966. It is also interesting to note that Indonesia is listed first in the introduction to the Draft Declaration.
22. This author wrote (Ref 1, pp 191-92):

A regional or subregional association that combined the dramatic nature of MAPHILINDO with the concreteness of ASA could bring major advantages. . . . if such a new group carefully provided for Indonesia's style (as in its name and stated goals), it could satisfy certain of the foreign-policy aspirations of many leading Indonesians, and at the same time provide the incentive and rationale for domestic efforts aimed at the economic development of the country. This would be especially so if practical aspects of the new group were modeled after ASA—and one

- would expect that, if Thailand participated, the ASA model, with concrete projects in cooperation for development, would be important.
23. Memorandum from Secretary of Foreign Affairs Narciso Ramos to President Ferdinand Marcos, 6 Jan 66, subject: "Proposed Organization of Asian states."
 24. From draft letter 3 Jan 67 (typescript).
 25. Interviews, Kuala Lumpur, January 1967.
 26. Antara, 12 Apr 67.
 27. Antara, 21 Apr 67.
 28. Antara, 16 Apr 67.
 29. According to this report the Malaysia Prime Minister said that the door of ASA was always open to Indonesia and that they could come in any time and make it a success. The Tunku also added that ASA was small and could easily be made a success, but "I do not know what will happen if another and bigger organization is set up in a similar manner."²⁸
 30. Reuters Dispatch, 20 Apr 67.
 31. As early as August 1966 the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak, announced that his country and Indonesia had agreed in principle to the "establishment of a joint commission for the defense and security of the two countries." The Washington Post, 17 Aug 66.
 32. In interviews several foreign ministry officials have said that Indonesia's "dominance" in Southeast Asia had to be recognized and lived with.
 33. A brief but instructive insight to Malaysia's approach to development planning is in ASIA Magazine, 30 Oct 66, pp 10-11. The approach there should be contrasted with the brilliant exposition of Indonesia's needs, as seen by Dr. Sumitro, the economist sometimes referred to as Indonesia's "economic wizard." The Suharto government has approved his return after an exile of 10 years. See "Sumitro Speaks," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 Aug 67, pp 287-93.
 34. This text is from the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN; press release 16, The ASEAN Declaration, 8 Aug 67.
 35. For some of the initial announcements see The New York Times, 10 Aug 65; The Washington Post, 13 Aug 65.
 36. The Washington Post, 31 May 66.
 37. Conversation with Dr. Wong Lin Ken, Ambassador from Singapore, Washington, D. C., August 1967.
 38. The Washington Post, 3 Mar 67.
 39. It was reported that Lee had proposed an "All-Asian security arrangement" while visiting India.
 Without being specific Lee proposed that India and Singapore, as well as other Asian countries, begin thinking about how they could group together to defend themselves against any Chinese threat mounted after the Westerners pulled out. Lee told friends here [New Delhi] the Indian officials showed no interest and abruptly changed the subject. [The Washington Post, 17 Sep 66].
 40. Initially Singapore was not included in the SEAARC invitation that Thailand sent out late in 1966. This was probably because Thanat wished to avoid steps that might upset the Tunku—for Malaysian-Singapore relations continued to be troubled. Nevertheless all leaders involved in the SEAARC development stated early in 1967 their belief that Singapore must be included in any genuine efforts at Southeast Asian regionalism. [Interviews with Foreign Secretary Ramos; Foreign Ministers Thanat, Malik, and Rajaratnam and Permanent Secretary for External Affairs (Malaysia) Tan Sri Ghazalie Bin Schafie, January and February 1967]
 41. Frances L. Starnes, "Once Bitten, Twice Shy," in Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 Jul 67. This article is a reflection of what Rajaratnam wanted the author of the article to believe; it is less helpful as a reflection of some of his and Lee's genuine attitudes and their behavior.
 42. Speaking in Bangkok in May, Rajaratnam announced that Singapore was "ready to join" the regional organization outlined to him by Thanat Khoman. Bangkok Post, 4 May 67. Two days later he added that economic cooperation was essential for nations undertaking regional arrangements: "If they choose to remain purely as

rational unions in the economic field, in the foreseeable future they will be left behind and collapse on their own accord." Bangkok Post, 6 May 67.

43. Kathryn Rafferty, "Foreign Policy in the Philippines," paper, Research Analysis Corporation, in preparation.
44. Obviously Thanat did not object to the phrase, for otherwise it would not have appeared in his draft SEAARC Declaration. Malaysia probably did not object to these words, for they are not mentioned in the letter that the Tunku addressed to Thanat in January 1967. The Tunku's objection, it will be recalled, was that it was simply premature to build a new organization with Indonesia as a member. And Singapore would not have objected to a condemnation of "big power" collective-defense agreements, for Lee has long been a critic of military blocs. Marcos, on the other hand, is most likely to have been sensitive to his SEATO ties, for the Philippine leadership has always recognized that its ultimate security depends on the American guarantees.
45. From the text of the statement by Philippine Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Plenary Session, 8 Aug 67.
46. See Straits Times, 1 Apr 67, for letter of M. R. Logarta and reports in that and immediately succeeding edition.
Without question these relations were not smoothed when early in 1968 the Malaysian government announced the arrest of "20 armed Filipinos in Sabah" and protested formally to Manila that there was a "special force being trained in the Philippines to infiltrate and subvert Malaysia" (Reuters report 23 Mar 68, The Washington Post, 24 Mar 68). In all likelihood the government of the Philippines is not engaged in this activity, although private parties interested in Sabah could well be interested in disrupting Philippine-Malaysian relations. Nevertheless, the earlier history of the Sabah claim has made leaders in Kuala Lumpur prepared to hear the worst about Philippine intentions.
47. See the detailed discussion of this point in the author's, "Foreign Policies in the Wake of Konfrontasi," a paper read before the Annual Meetings of the Association of Asian Studies, March 1967. See also Richard Butwell, "Malaysia and Its Impact on the International Relations of Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, IV: 946 (Jul 64).
48. Narciso Reyes, interview with the author, Djakarta, October 1964.
49. Editorial, Manila Times, 15 Jul 67.
50. Nor is it the case yet in Cambodia, although Prince Sihanouk has since about 1958 begun to build, superbly in this writer's estimate, a sense of continuity and purpose into Cambodian actions.
51. In an unpublished study only recently available to this author, former Ambassador Kenneth T. Young has stressed this same point: "The Thais have consciously sought to avoid over-dependence on any one paramount power and have appeared uncomfortable when they had to." "The Foreign Policies of Thailand," mimeo, 1965.
52. From press conference, particularly in reaction to Senator Fulbright's suggestion that Thailand is a "client state," The Washington Post, 30 Oct 66.
53. For a good statement of Thanat's Vietnam views, including his endorsement of Vietnam bombing, see his interview in Asia Magazine, 23 Oct 66, pp 14-17; and his formal address at the 11th SEATO Council Meeting, Canberra, 27 Jan 66.
54. For a description of the US military involvement in Thailand, see Bernard K. Gordon, "Thailand: Its Threefold Meaning to the United States," Current History Jan 67.
55. Thanat has expressed these views in many forums; for one illustration see his interview with Drew Middleton, The New York Times, 12 Apr 67. He has also expressed similar views in several conversations with this author, especially in 1966 and 1967.
56. Arguing against the proposal of Senator Fulbright and others for neutralization of "the entire region of Southeast Asia," Thanat has said that "such a proposal because of its one-sided character may serve only to postpone the communist conquest, and by emasculating the defence of non-communist nations. . . make them inescapable victims of future communist expansion." (speech at Canberra⁵³)
57. Interview with the author, Manila, July 1963.
58. Invariably when the author has asked Malaysian leaders to name the Asian state

with whom they had the closest and most trusting relations they have named Thailand. Similarly when Thanat was asked over the past 5 years to discuss the relations of his country with others in Southeast Asia he had always specified Malaysia and its leaders as the actors with whom he has had the closest rapport.

59. Some, including Pote Sarasin, have said in conversations with this writer that "any people which tolerated three hundred years of Dutch rule would not be much of a force in Southeast Asia."
60. The one exception to this statement in Southeast Asia is Thanat. At least through early 1967 Thanat maintained some enthusiasm for ASPAC. As he said to this author, however, ASPAC itself is less important as an institution than for its importance in keeping alive the concept of Asian regionalism. With ASEAN's establishment he may feel, as some of his assistants in the Thai Foreign Ministry already believe, that the activities of ASA and ASEAN make ASPAC redundant.
61. Data on the developments leading to ASPAC and its first meeting can be found in The New York Times, 17 Jun 66; The Washington Post, 19 Jun 66, p A10; The New York Times, 20 Jun 66; The Washington Post, 17 Jun 66. The Joint Communique of ASPAC, issued on 16 Jun 66, is available from Korean government sources.
62. Reports on ASPAC's second meeting are in The New York Times, 6 Jul 67; The Washington Star, 17 Jul 67; and the Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 Jul 67, pp 138-39. In all reports, emphasis was on discord in the organization and aimlessness about its purposes.

In addition the author has consulted the following unpublished documents emanating from ASPAC and several member nations: "Progress of the Sub-Committee of ASPAC," 19 Aug 66; "Report of the Second Meeting of the Standing Committee," 5 Sep 66; "Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Standing Committee," Bangkok, 21 Dec 66; "Report by the Malaysian Delegation of the Third Meeting of the Standing Committee," 21 Dec 66; and a series of confidential proposals for a "Technicians Pool," a "Draft Plan for the Establishment of a Center for Asian and Pacific Studies," a "Working Paper on the Establishment of an Asian-Pacific Agricultural Technology Exchange Center," a "Working Paper on the Establishment of a Food and Fertilizer Bank for the Asian-Pacific Region," and others.

63. The statements of Malik's representative Anwar Seni and Prince Sihancuk's reply were reported by Djakarta Radio on 16 May 67.

Malik visited Burma in late May and spoke with GEN Ne Win and others. His visit and the favorable reactions to his proposal (though without endorsement) were reported by Rangoon Radio, 24 May 67.